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Abstract
When embedding data are used to argue against semantic theory A and in favor of semantic
theory B, it is important to ask whether A could make sense of those data. It is possible to ask
that question on a case-by-case basis. But suppose we could show that A can make sense of all
the embedding data whichB can possibly make sense of. This would, on the one hand, undermine
arguments in favor of B over A on the basis of embedding data. And, provided that the converse
does not hold—that is, that A can make sense of strictly more embedding data than B can—it
would also show that there is a precise sense in whichB is more constrained thanA, yielding a pro
tanto simplicity-based consideration in favor of B. In this paper I develop tools which allow us to
make comparisons of this kind, which I call comparisons of potential expressive power. I motivate
the development of these tools by way of exploration of the recent debate about epistemic modals.
Prominent theories which have been developed in response to embedding data turn out to be
strictly less expressive than the standard relational theory, a fact which necessitates a reorientation
in how to think about the choice between these theories.
Keywords: relative expressibility; semantic theories; epistemic modals; attitude predicates
1 Introduction
When embedding data are used to argue against semantic theory A and in favor of semantic theory
B, it is important to ask whether A could, after all, make sense of those data. It is possible to ask
that question on a case-by-case basis. But suppose we could show that A can make sense of all the
embedding data which B can make sense of. This would, on the one hand, undermine arguments in
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favor of B over A on the basis of embedding data. And, provided that the converse does not hold—
that is, that A can make sense of strictly more embedding data than B can—it would also show that
there is a precise sense in which B is more constrained than A, yielding a pro tanto simplicity-based
consideration in favor of B.
In this paper I develop formal tools which allow us to make comparisons of this kind, which I
call comparisons of potential expressive power. I motivate the development of these tools through
discussion of the recent debate about epistemic modals (words like ‘might’ and ‘must’, on a broadly
epistemic reading). Recent work has used embedding data to argue against the standard relational
theory—on which epistemic modals have, roughly, the semantics of modal operators in standard modal
logics—and in favor of various revisionary theories. But comparisons of potential expressive power
show that those revisionary theories are strictly less expressive than the standard theory, in the sense
that the relational theory can make sense of any embedding data involving epistemic modals which
those theories can make sense of, but not vice versa (within very mild limits). This necessitates a
reorientation in how to think about the choice between these semantics. The situation is roughly the
opposite of the way it is standardly presented: we can rest assured that the relational theory can account
for any data which those revisionary theories can account for. But not vice versa: we may well discover
data that the relational theory can make sense of, but that the revisionary theories cannot. This, in turn,
shows that there is a precise sense in which these revisionary theories are simpler than the relational
theory, which may count in their favor.
The tools developed here allow us to state these facts in a rigorous and general way, which, among
other things, makes application to other debates straightforward. Considerations of relative potential
expressive power cannot on their own decide between two semantic theories, but they can help us
determine what kinds of arguments from natural language on the basis of embedding data are possibly
good arguments in the choice between those theories. In the final part of the paper, I consider in more
detail the empirical picture concerning the behavior of epistemic modals in attitude contexts, and what
this behavior tells us about the theory of epistemic modals in light of the foregoing expressibility
results.
2 Background
I begin by introducing the relational semantics for epistemic modals; Yalcin (2007)’s data and his
revisionary domain semantics response to those data; and Ninan (2016)’s response to Yalcin, which
shows that the relational semantics can replicate the predictions of the domain semantics.
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2.1 The relational theory
On the relational theory (e.g. Kripke 1963; Kratzer 1977, 1981), epistemic modals denote quantifiers
over a set of worlds: namely, over those worlds which are accessible from the world of evaluation
relative to a binary accessibility relation between worlds (equivalently and more conveniently, a cor-
responding modal base function from worlds to sets of worlds). The accessibility relation for epistemic
modals is generally taken to track the contextually relevant evidence: a world is accessible from an-
other world just in case it’s compatible with the contextually relevant evidence in that world. ‘Might’
is treated as an existential quantifier, so pMight ϕq is a claim that the contextually relevant evidence
leaves it open that ϕ is true;1 ‘must’ is treated as the dual universal quantifier, so pMust ϕq is a claim
that the contextually relevant evidence entails that ϕ is true. More formally:2
Definition 2.1. Relational Semantics: Where f is a modal base:
• [[Might ϕ]]f,w= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ f(w) : [[ϕ]]f,w′ = 1
• [[Must ϕ]]f,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ f(w) : [[ϕ]]f,w′ = 1
2.2 Yalcin (2007)’s challenge
Yalcin (2007) observed that, when you embed a sentence with the form pϕ and might not ϕq (which
he calls an epistemic contradiction) under ‘Suppose’, the result is infelicitous:3
(1) a. #Suppose it’s raining and it might not be raining.
b. #Suppose (ϕ and might not ϕ).
The issue for the relational approach is that it seems to predict that a sentence like (1-a) will be per-
fectly felicitous. To spell out the problem, let’s focus (as Yalcin does) on the corresponding declarative
sentence. A sentence like (2) is felt to attribute inconsistent suppositions to Alfred, a fact which ex-
plains why the imperative variant will be felt to be infelicitous:
(2) a. Alfred supposes it’s raining and it might not be raining.
1Greek letters range over all sentences. Italic roman letters below range over atomic sentences. I will leave off a context
parameter throughout, for readability; insofar as the languages we are working with contain context-sensitive terms (beyond
epistemic modals), these should be read as implicit throughout.
2This presentation simplifies Kratzer’s theory in two ways, one irrelevant (for Kratzer, a modal base is a function from
worlds to sets of propositions, not worlds, and quantification is over the intersection of that set), and one possibly relevant
(for Kratzer, modals are evaluated relative to a second parameter, an ordering source). Insofar as an ordering source plays
in interesting role in what follows, though, it makes the relational theory even more expressive than it is on the present
simplification.
3Parallel observations concerning the embedding of sentences with this form in the scope of quantifiers were made in
Groenendijk et al. 1996; Aloni 2001, and were used to motivate the update semantics, discussed below. I focus on Yalcin’s
version of the argument only because it is simpler.
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b. A supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ).
But, given the relational semantics, it looks like (2-a) is predicted to say that Alfred supposes that it’s
raining, and supposes that the contextually salient body of evidence is compatible with the proposition
that it’s not raining. In other words, (2-a) should be roughly equivalent to (3), which is not felt to
attribute any kind of inconsistency to Alfred.
(3) Alfred supposes that it’s raining and that, for all he knows, it’s not raining.
To make this worry more precise, we need to spell out some background assumptions which, as we
will see, are crucial for getting the puzzle going. First, Yalcin assumes that connectives have classical
Boolean semantics.4 Second, Yalcin generalizes Hintikka (1962)’s theory of attitude predicates to the
relational semantics as follows. On Hintikka’s approach, attitude predicates denote universal quanti-
fiers over the possible worlds compatible with the relevant attitude (for attitude verb V and agent A,
let ‘VA,w’ denote the worlds compatible with everything that A V’s in w). Yalcin assumes further that
attitude verbs do not change the setting of the modal base parameter, so the schematic result is as
follows:
Definition 2.2. Simple Hintikkan semantics:
• [[A V’s ϕ]]f,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[ϕ]]f,w′ = 1
Thus, in particular, pA supposes ϕq, evaluated at modal base f and world w, just says that ϕ is true at
every world compatible with A’s suppositions inw, relative to f . Together with the relational semantics
for epistemic modals and Boolean semantics for connectives, we thus predict that pA supposes (ϕ and
might not ϕ)q, as evaluated at modal base f and world w, says that every world in A’s supposition
state makes ϕ true (relative to f ), and that every world in A’s supposition state can access under f
some world where ϕ is false. So, if the modal base tracks something like A’s knowledge, then (2-a)
should just mean something like (3), and thus should not be felt to ascribe incompatible suppositions
to Alfred.
2.3 Yalcin (2007)’s domain semantics
This is a puzzle for the combination of the relational semantics with the simple Hintikkan seman-
tics for attitude verbs given here together with the Boolean semantics for connectives. Yalcin (2007)
responded to this puzzle by developing a theory that is revisionary twice over, rejecting both the rela-
tional theory of epistemic modals and the simple Hintikka semantics for attitude verbs. First, Yalcin
4That is, [[ϕ and ψ]]f,w= 1 iff [[ϕ]]f,w= 1 and [[ψ]]f,w= 1; and [[Not ϕ]]f,w= 1 iff [[ϕ]]f,w= 0.
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adopts a domain semantics for epistemic modals (crediting an early version of MacFarlane 2011). On
the domain semantics, epistemic modals denote quantifiers over a set of worlds (information state) s
which is supplied, not by an accessibility relation, but rather as a world-independent parameter of the
index.
Definition 2.3. Domain semantics:
• [[Might ϕ]]s,w= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ s : [[ϕ]]s,w′ = 1
• [[Must ϕ]]s,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ s : [[ϕ]]s,w′ = 1
Thus pMight ϕq says that the truth of ϕ is compatible with a given information state; pMust ϕq says
that the truth of ϕ is entailed by a given information state. The domain semantics is just like the rela-
tional semantics except that it substitutes information states where the relational semantics has func-
tions from worlds to information states. Let me note that I will use ‘domain semantics’ and ‘relational
semantics’ to denote just the semantics for epistemic modals given here and above, separate from the
semantics for attitude verbs and connectives that each of these theories has been typically coupled
with (I use ‘relational/domain framework’ for a semantic theory which extends the relational/domain
theories). This lets us focus on the question of how those particular semantics for epistemic modals
can be motivated on their own, rather than as part of a package deal.
Yalcin generalizes the classical semantics for the connectives to the domain semantics in the ob-
vious way.5 Yalcin, finally, develops a new semantics for attitude verbs, which builds on the core
Hintikka semantics, but stipulates that the attitude verb supplies the set of attitude worlds as the do-
main of quantification for its complement. Schematically, for attitude verb V, Yalcin proposes:6
Definition 2.4. Yalcin semantics for attitude verbs:
• [[A V’s ϕ]]s,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[ϕ]]VA,w,w′ = 1.
That is, pA V’s ϕq is true at w and s just in case ϕ is true at every world compatible with what A V’s
at w, relative to VA,w.
This combination of views accounts for Yalcin’s data as follows. Consider a sentence with the
form of (4):
(4) A supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ).
Given Yalcin’s approach to attitude verbs (plus Boolean connectives), (4) will be true at w, relative to
any information state, just in case, at every world w′ in SA,w (the set of worlds compatible with A’s
5Namely, [[ϕ and ψ]]s,w= 1 iff [[ϕ]]s,w= 1 and [[ψ]]s,w= 1, and [[Not ϕ]]s,w= 1 iff [[ϕ]]s,w= 0.
6Yalcin presents a semantics only for ‘supposes’, but suggests that it should be extended to other attitudes in the obvious
way; for simplicity, I am presenting the general format here. Likewise for Ninan’s semantics below.
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suppositions in w), pϕ and might not ϕq is true relative to 〈SA,w, w′〉. This follows just in case, for
every world w′ in SA,w, ϕ is true at 〈SA,w, w′〉; and, for every world w′ in SA,w, there is some world
w′′ in SA,w such that ϕ is false at 〈SA,w, w′′〉. Clearly these two conditions can only both be met if
SA,w is empty. Thus a sentence with the form of (4) will ascribe inconsistent suppositions to A. This,
again, suffices to account for Yalcin’s data: the imperative version of (4) will be infelicitous because
it will be a command to make an inconsistent supposition.7
2.4 Ninan (2016)’s response
Yalcin’s proposal is, again, revisionary in two respects: it couples a new semantics for modals (the
domain semantics) with a new semantics for attitude verbs. Ninan (2016) shows that there is a way
to account for Yalcin’s data while maintaining the relational semantics for epistemic modals. For any
set of worlds s, let fs be the constant function which takes any world to s. Then, for attitude verb V,
modal base f , and world w, Ninan proposes:
Definition 2.5. Ninan semantics for attitude verbs:
• [[A V’s ϕ]]f,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[ϕ]]f
VA,w ,w′ = 1.
The resemblance to Yalcin’s attitude semantics is clear, and this approach accounts for Yalcin’s data
in essentially the same way that Yalcin’s semantics does, but within a relational framework. To see
this, suppose pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q is true at world w and modal base f . Given Ninan
attitude semantics, plus the relational semantics for modals and Boolean connectives, this holds just
in case, for every world w′ compatible with A’s suppositions at w, w′ has the following properties: (i)
ϕ is true at
〈
fSA,w , w′
〉
; (ii) there is some world w′′ in fSA,w(w′) such that ϕ is false at
〈
fSA,w , w′′
〉
.
Given that fSA,w(w′) = SA,w, it is easy to confirm that these conditions are only met when A’s sup-
positions are inconsistent, and so pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q will entail that A’s suppositions
are inconsistent, as in Yalcin’s system.
3 Relative potential expressibility
Is it a fluke that Ninan was able to reproduce, in a relational framework, the interaction of Yalcin’s
attitude verbs with the domain semantics—or is there a deeper fact about the relationship between
the domain and relational semantics which accounts for this? This is an important question for both
practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, this is an important question because Yalcin’s data are not
7Yalcin (2007) in fact claims that, on his semantics, a sentence with the form pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q is itself a
contradiction, but this would only follow if we add a presupposition that the attitude is consistent, as Ninan (2016) proposes.
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the only challenge to the relational semantics from embedding behavior. Yalcin 2007 discusses similar
data involving epistemic contradictions in the antecedents of conditionals, and related challenges on
epistemic modals in a variety of different embedding environments has raised related challenges for
relational approaches and been used to argue in favor of revisionary semantics.8 Ninan’s system shows
that the relational semantics can make sense of just some of these data. One way to proceed would be
to go through each data point, and see whether the relational framework can replicate the predictions
of the revisionary accounts with respect to those data. But this approach is inefficient; and, more
problematically, even if this method showed that all known data can be accounted for in the relational
framework, this would still leave open the possibility that more data are lurking undiscovered which a
revisionary approach can account for, but which the relational semantics cannot account for. It would
be far more helpful if we could show that the relational framework can account for any embedding
data which can be accounted for in the revisionary frameworks. From a more theoretical point of
view, answering this question will elucidate the structure of the underlying relationship between the
relational semantics and its competitors. And intuitively, it is very natural to think that there is a sense
in which the domain semantics is simpler and more constrained than the relational semantics, as Ninan
(2016) points out. In this section I will spell out a general framework which allows us to spell out these
intuitions in a precise way, by comparing the expressive power of two theories of a given fragment—
like the relational and domain semantics—with respect to what embedding operators are definable
within those two theories.
Let me first note that, in the choice between semantic theories, embedding data invariably provide
just one motivation. There will also be framework-level considerations which are at least somewhat
independent of particular embedding data. In the debate about epistemic modals in particular, issues
about assertability, disagreement, and retraction have played a crucial role. Thus, for instance, Yalcin
advocates the domain semantics as part of an expressivist approach to epistemic modality; MacFarlane
advocates it as part of a relativist approach. Ninan, for his part, remains neutral about the ‘post-
semantics’ he intends for his semantics, but the relational semantics is most commonly coupled with
a contextualist post-semantics (though it needn’t be). The choice between these frameworks turns, at
least in substantial part, on issues that are independent of embedding data.9 As Ninan (2010) discusses
in detail, while it is possible that embedding data will have some impact on the choice between these
frameworks, the impact will be at best indirect; embedding data tell us about the logic of the operator
we are studying, but not about assertion, disagreement, truth, and so on.10 I will focus in this paper
8See Beaver 1994; Groenendijk et al. 1996; Gerbrandy 1998; Aloni 2000, 2001; Yalcin 2015; Rothschild and Klinedinst
2015; Ninan 2018; Mandelkern 2019.
9See e.g. Lewis 1980; Ninan 2010; Rabern 2012, 2013 on the distinction between assertoric and semantic content; for
relativist approaches, see e.g. Egan et al. 2005; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011, 2014; for expressivism, e.g. Yalcin
2007; Swanson 2015; Moss 2015; for contextualism, e.g. Dowell (2011); Khoo (2015); Mandelkern (2018a).
10Though there may be an indirect bearing—for instance, the logical facts may go more naturally with one conception
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narrowly on the choice of semantic theories, not post-semantic theories.
Abstracting from the particulars of epistemic modals, the kind of question that I want to address
is the following. Given two semantic theories of a given language, suppose that we add an arbitrary
new sentence operator to the language, and extend the first semantic theory to give a compositional
semantics for the resulting language.11 Can we be guaranteed to find a way of extending the second
semantic theory to give a compositional semantics for that operator such that the operator has exactly
the same logic, according to the second theory, as it does according to the first theory? If so, we know
that the first theory is no more expressive than the second theory with respect to embedding data. That
is, for any embedding data involving an operator O not covered by the first theory, if the first theory
can be extended to make sense of those data—that is, if we can extend the first theory so that we have
a semantics for O which makes all the right predictions about O’s logic—then we can also cover the
same data in the second theory: we can give a semantics for O in the second theory which makes all
the right predictions about O’s logic.
We can spell this out more precisely as follows. First, we make precise the notion of a semantic
theory (which I’ll denote T , T ′, and so on) for a language (a set of sentences L) which is meant to
correspond roughly to the kinds of systems that semanticists construct to make sense of fragments
of natural language. For propositional languages, we will let our models be sequences comprising a
set of possible worlds; a valuation function which takes atomic sentences in the language to subsets
of the set of possible worlds; a set of indices; and an interpretation function. Indices ordinarily will
be sequences which include a possible world or set of possible worlds (from the stock of worlds
in the model), and may also include other parameters, like an accessibility relation or set of worlds.
Interpretation functions interpret the language relative to the set of indices, given the model’s valuation
function: for any sentence and index, the interpretation function tells us whether the sentence is true
or false at that index. This extended notion of a model (relative to a standard account in modal logic)
allows us to schematize in a general way very different kinds of semantic theories, and thus to compare
those approaches. Finally, a semantic theory of a language is any set of models of that language. A
semantic theory for a language yields a logic for the language: for a set of sentences Γ and sentence
ψ from the language, Γ T ψ means that, in every model in T , ψ is true at every index where all the
elements of Γ are true.12 All of this is spelled out more formally in Appendix A.
With this in hand, we can define our notion of relative potential expressibility as follows:
Definition 3.1. Relative Potential Expressibility: Given two semantic theories T and T ′ for a language
of logical consequence than another, as e.g. Veltman (1996); Groenendijk et al. (1996); Yalcin (2007) have argued with
regards to epistemic modals.
11By ‘compositional’, I mean that the meaning of a sentence containing the operator in question with scope over some
sequence of sentences is obtained by applying the meaning of the operator (which we assume is an n-place propositional
function) to the meaning of the sentences it takes scope over.
12I write ϕ T ψ for {ϕ} T ψ.
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L, T is no more expressive than T ′ with respect toL (written T L T ′) iff, for any set of new sentence
operatorsO, for any extension T O of T to LO, there is an extension T ′O of T ′ to LO which preserves
the logic of O from T O.
LO is the closure of L under the elements of O. What it means for T ′O to preserve the logic of O
from T O is the following: for any set of sentences Γ ⊆ LO at least one of which contains an operator
from O (i.e. one of which is in LO \ L), for any sentence ψ in LO, (Γ T O ψ)↔ (Γ T ′O ψ). (More
details, again, in the appendix; ‘↔’ abbreviates meta-language ‘iff’.)
The notion of relative potential expressibility spelled out here is somewhat different from the
extant notions of expressibility I know of, which are typically concerned with comparisons between
different languages rather than with comparisons between different semantic theories of a language
with respect to arbitrary extensions of the language. But relative potential expressibility is just what
we need to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section. If T L T ′, this tells us that
T ′ can do anything T can with regard to arbitrary extensions of L, and thus that T ′ can make sense of
any embedding data that T can make sense of.13
Before exploring the application of this framework, let me note a helpful characterization result.
Relative potential expressibility between certain kinds of well-behaved semantic theories boils down
to something very simple: the existence of a truth-preserving injection from the indices of a model in
the first theory to those of a model in the second.
Fact 3.1. Characterization of Expressibility: For any semantic theories T and T ′ and language L, if
T is isomorphic with respect to L, and T ′ is isomorphic with respect to L, then T L T ′ iff there is
a modelM∈ T and a modelM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a injection g from the indices ofM to those
ofM′ which preserves the truth of all sentences in L, i.e. such that ∀ϕ ∈ L, for any index i fromM,
ϕ is true at i inM iff ϕ is true at g(i) atM′. A semantic theory T is isomorphic with respect to L iff
∀M,M′ ∈ T :MLM′ ∧M′ LM.
The proof of Fact 3.1, and of all the other facts stated in the rest of this section, are relegated to
Appendix A. I state this characterization result here because it greatly simplifies the proofs of the facts
that follow, and, I think, provides some intuitive grip on those results: whether one semantic theory
is less expressive than another (in the relevant sense) depends on the structural relations between
the semantic theories, and in particular whether the first semantic theory can, from a very abstract
perspective, be embedded into the second semantic theory in a truth-preserving way.
13There is some work on comparing expressive power across different classes of structures, though not to my knowledge
anything along the lines of what I am proposing here; see Pinheiro Fernandes 2017 for an overview and relevant citations,
in particular Mossakowski et al. 2009, which proposes a structurally similar framework (in particular in their definition
of sublogics), but one that remains quite different in its details. Cf. also French (2017) for investigation of the notion of
notational equivalence over possible extensions of the language.
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Let me make a final note about the relation between relative potential expressibility and the relative
strength of logics. If T L T ′, then the logic of L in T ′ can be no stronger than the logic of L in T
(they may have the same logic, but it may also be that the logic of L in T is strictly stronger than the
logic of L in T ′).14 But it is not guaranteed to be weaker (even if T is strictly less expressive than T ′,
i.e. T ≺L T ′). Nor does the converse follow: if the logic of L in T ′ is no stronger than the logic of L in
T , there is no guarantee that T L T ′; likewise, if the logic of L in T ′ is strictly weaker than the logic
of L in T , there is no guarantee that T L T ′. So, while relative potential expressibility has some
bearing on relative logical strength, these two ways of comparing semantic theories are orthogonal.
(Even if they turned out to coincide, this would itself be a substantive fact, since it would not have
been at all obvious that they should coincide; that they fail to coincide shows that they get at distinct
features of semantic theories).15
3.1 The domain and relational semantics
With this discussion in hand, I will turn my attention to the specific comparisons of expressive power
which I will focus on here: namely, comparisons between different semantics for epistemic modals.
A note to readers: the rest of this section is concerned with introducing a variety of semantics for
epistemic modals and comparing their expressive power. I succinctly summarize these results at the
beginning of the next section (§4); readers uninterested in the details that follow may wish to skim up
to that point.
Since our focus is on epistemic modals, I will compare semantic theories for a very simple lan-
guage L♦ comprising infinitely many atomic sentences pi : i ∈ N (which I will write p, q, r etc.)
together with sentences of the form ♦ϕ, for any sentence ϕ ∈ L♦ (♦ abbreviates ‘might’).16 Let R
denote the relational semantics, and D the domain semantics. These are, again, classes of models, in
14It may look as though, if T L T ′, then we can prove that the logic of L in T ′ must be the same as in T : we sim-
ply introduce a one-place sentence operator Id to L, and give Id the semantics in T of the identity function: for all ϕ,
[[Id(ϕ)]]T = [[ϕ]]T . Then we will be guaranteed to be able to give Id a semantics in T ′ such that the logic of Id in the
extension of T ′ matches that of Id in the extension of T . But the fact that we can do this does not, contrary to first appear-
ances, guarantee that L has the same logic in the extension of T ′ as in the extension of T , because nothing guarantees that
Id will still denote the identity function in the extension of T ′—this is no part of the logic of Id.
15An anonymous referee for this journal points out that there are, however, interesting cases in which these two notions do
coincide. It seems to me both a striking fact that they do not coincide in general, and that there are limited cases where they
do, and it seems worth further exploration exactly when they coincide, and why. Things would have been otherwise had we
defined T L T ′ in a slightly different way, such that this means that for arbitrary extensionLO ofL and extension T O of
T , we can extend T ′ to a model T ′O which matches the logic of LO in T O , i.e. which is such that for any Γ∪{ψ} ⊆ LO ,
(Γ TO ψ)↔ (Γ T ′O ψ). We instead said that T ′O only must match the logic of O in T O . This means that T L T ′
does not at all entail that T and T ′ have to agree on the logic of L. This, in turn, makes it possible to compare the relative
expressive power of semantic theories which start with different logics for a given language—as the domain and relational
semantics do—with respect to possible enrichments of those languages, something which, as we will see, turns out to be
very revealing. Otherwise comparisons of relative potential expressive power would be limited to starting languages with
identical logics.
16I let sentences of the language name themselves for brevity.
10
the sense given above; I assume that the models in every case contain sets of possible worlds and
valuation functions such that for any set of atoms, exactly that set is true at some world, and any two
worlds differ on the truth of some atom. Recall that for any model r ∈ R, an index in that model is any
pair 〈f, w〉, with f a modal base and w a possible world drawn from r’s stock of worlds. An atomic
sentence p is true in r at 〈f, w〉 just in case the model’s valuation function takes p to true at w; and ♦ϕ
is true in r at 〈f, w〉 just in case there is a world w′ in f(w) such that ϕ is true at 〈f, w′〉 according to r.
Recall that an index in any model d ∈ D is a pair 〈s, w〉, with s an information state and w a possible
world. An atomic sentence p is true in d at 〈s, w〉 just in case p is true at w according to d’s valuation
function. A sentence with the form ♦ϕ is true at 〈s, w〉 in d just in case there is a world w′ ∈ s such
that ϕ is true at 〈s, w′〉 according to d.
We have some flexibility in how we think about entailment in the domain framework. The classical
notion of entailment would say that for any domain model d, Γ d ψ iff ψ is true at every index in d
where all the members of Γ are. But a different route, suggested by Yalcin (2007), would be to treat
entailment as preservation of acceptance rather than truth, where an index 〈s, w〉 accepts a sentence
ϕ iff for every world w′ ∈ s, ϕ is true at 〈s, w′〉. Preservation of truth is a strictly stronger notion
than preservation of acceptance: if ψ is true at every index where all the members of Γ are, then
ψ is also accepted at every index where all the members of Γ are. But preservation of acceptance
does not entail preservation of truth; to take a simple example, p entails ♦p in the preservation of
acceptance sense, but not in the preservation of truth sense (at least not without further stipulation
about our models).17 So which logical notion will be the most illuminating for our purposes? I think it
is the preservation of truth notion, for a few reasons. For one thing, on the preservation of acceptance
notion, the domain semantics ends up being equivalent to the state-based semantics discussed below.
So, just for the sake of diversity, it is worth exploring a different perspective on the domain semantics;
readers who are interested in what we would find with a preservation of acceptance notion are referred
to the discussion of the state-based semantics below. Second, this perspective renders the domain
semantics more expressive than it otherwise would be; the acceptance-based approach renders the
world parameter of indices essentially invisible, bleaching the semantics of a good deal of expressive
strength (as we will see below in the discussion of the state-based semantics). There are many ways
to think about the logic of a given system; I think that for present purposes it makes sense to take
a vantage point which does not wash out any part of the semantics’ inherent expressive power. This
allows us to explore the expressive power of the semantics itself, as it were, rather than of the semantics
under a certain, possibly limiting, perspective. Thus I will stick with the preservation of truth notion
of consequence for both the relational and domain semantics.
17Yalcin (2007) countenances the possibility that a domain index 〈s, w〉 should always be such that w ∈ s, in which case
this disanalogy would drop out. With or without this addition, the acceptance-based logic remains strictly weaker than the
truth-based logic across extensions of the language.
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With this in mind, we can show that the domain semantics is no more expressive than the relational
semantics:
Fact 3.2. D L♦ R.
Proofs of all these results are, again, included in the appendix, but I will say a bit here about the
intuition behind each proof. In this case, the proof strategy is to choose an arbitrary model in D and
construct a function g which takes any index 〈s, w〉 in that model to 〈fs, w〉, where fs is the constant
function from worlds to s. Then Fact 3.2 follows from our characterization result in Fact 3.1.18
Next we show that the relational semantics is not less expressive than the domain semantics with
respect to L♦:
Fact 3.3. R L♦ D.
Fact 3.3 follows immediately from the observation that, for any index i in any model in D, ♦ϕ is
trueD at i iff ♦(♦ϕ) is; but the same does not hold in R. This will make it impossible to find a truth-
preserving injection from the indices of any R to those of any D model. I should note here that this
difference in logics in the logic of L♦ itself may be taken on its own as an argument for, or against,
the domain semantics, depending on what one thinks of the claim that ♦(♦ϕ) is always equivalent to
♦ϕ—a claim, again, validated by D but not byR. Yalcin claims this kind of logical feature as a virtue
of his theory, while Moss (2015) criticizes this prediction. I will not explore that debate here, though.
Our concern is with a very different question: ignoring the logical differences between the domain and
relational semantics within L♦, which theory is better equipped to account for embedding data which
involve operators beyond our starting language L♦? It is this latter question I focus on here, though the
former may, of course, play an important independent role in the final choice between these theories.
Thus from Facts 3.2 and 3.3, we have that the domain semantics is strictly less expressive than the
relational semantics with respect to L♦.
Fact 3.4. D ≺L♦ R.
It is worth noting that ‘might’s are not generally able to stack in natural language: that is, sentences
with the form pMight (Might ϕ)q are generally infelicitous.19 This may make it seem as though Fact
3.3 holds due to an irrelevant technicality. But this is not so: we still have an expressive inequality
between the domain and relational semantics even if we add a syntactic constraint which rules out
embedded ‘might’s (and thus which renders the logics of each theory for this more limited language
fully equivalent). In other words, where L♦− is the language comprising just atomic sentences from
L♦ and sentences of the form ♦pi, where pi is any atom, we still have:
18Note that it is easy to extend this to a proof that the domain semantics is no more expressive than the relational semantics
with respect to an expanded language containing not just atoms and ‘might’ sentences, but also sentences formed with the
Boolean connectives.
19Though see Moss 2015 for discussion of nested epistemic modals.
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Fact 3.5. D ≺L♦− R.
The intuition behind these facts is that sets of worlds are in some sense less fine-grained than functions
from worlds to sets of worlds (though this is not a fact about cardinality: given a fixed infinite stock of
worlds, the set of domain indices and the set of relational indices have the same cardinality).
3.2 The update and state-based semantics
An important fact about the formal tools developed here is that it is straightforward to apply them to
further comparisons: nothing in the kind of comparison we are doing here depends on details of the
domain or relational semantics. In the rest of this section, I will illustrate this by exploring the relative
potential expressive power of a few more revisionary semantics of epistemic modals which have been
motivated by embedding data. In each case, the relational semantics comes out as the most expressive
option.
First, the comparison of expressive power can be extended to the update semantics. In the update
semantics U , due to Veltman (1996), building on Heim 1982, 1983, the intension of a complex sen-
tence is a dynamic object: a function from information states (usually called contexts in this literature)
to information states. The most natural way to think about this approach from the point of view of
the formal framework we are using is to think of our “indices” as pairs of contexts, with ϕ “true” at
a pair 〈s, c〉 in U just in case 〈s, c〉 ∈ [[ϕ]]U . As for the domain semantics, we have different options
for thinking about entailment. The option most parallel to the approach we’ve taken so far would treat
entailment as preservation of truth, so that ϕ U ψ just in case the function denoted by ϕ in U is a sub-
set of a function denoted by ψ in U (likewise, ceteris paribus, for multi-premise entailment). This is a
non-standard way of thinking about entailment in the dynamic framework. A different approach would
be to treat our indices simply as contexts, rather than pairs of contexts, and then treat entailment as
preservation of acceptance, where a context c accepts a sentence ϕ just in case c is a fixed point for ϕ,
i.e. just in case [[ϕ]]U (c) = c. This would bring our notion of entailment in line with Veltman (1996)’s
(third) notion of entailment as preservation of acceptance. Just as for the domain semantics, however,
I think the truth-based notion is the more interesting one, for essentially the same reasons. First, on
an acceptance-based notion, the update semantics ends up, again, equivalent for our purposes to the
state-based semantics, so the discussion of the state-based semantics below will suffice to show what
would result from an acceptance-based perspective on the update semantics. Second, the truth-based
notion of consequence is strictly stronger than the acceptance-based notion, i.e., if Γ entails ϕ in the
truth-based notion, Γ also entails ϕ in the acceptance-based notion, but not vice versa. The truth-based
notion of consequence thus provides a more expressive perspective on the update semantics; again,
the update semantics can plausibly be coupled with a variety of different logics, but I think for present
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purposes it makes sense to couple it with a logic which does not wash out any of its expressive power,
and so I will stick with the truth-based notion.20 Readers interested in the perspective gained from an
acceptance-based vantage point on the update semantics are, again, referred to the discussion of the
state-based semantics below.
With this background, we can gloss the usual update semantic rules for atomic sentences and ♦
as follows. For any model u ∈ U , an atomic sentence p is trueu at 〈s, c〉 just in case c is the result
of removing all worlds w from s such that vu(p, w) = 0, where vu is u’s valuation function. And a
sentence of the form ♦ϕ “tests” whether ϕ is compatible with the input context: ♦ϕ is trueu at 〈s, c〉
just in case, roughly, s includes a ϕ-world and s = c, or s doesn’t include a ϕ-world, and c = ∅; more
precisely, just in case [[ϕ]]u(s) 6= ∅ and s = c, or else [[ϕ]]u(s) = ∅ and c = ∅.
We first show that the update semantics is no more expressive than the relational semantics with
respect to L♦:
Fact 3.6. U L♦ R.
The proof goes by way of constructing an injection from pairs of contexts to relational indices which
preserves truth for all sentences in L♦. The injection goes by way of distinguishing a variety of dif-
ferent cases, and is not particularly intuitive, which makes Fact 3.6 somewhat surprising. We can also
show that the relational semantics is more expressive than the update semantics:
Fact 3.7. R L♦ U .
The proof is identical to the proof of Fact 3.3 (thatR L♦ D). Thus we have:
Fact 3.8. U ≺L♦ R.
Interestingly, though, we do not have parallel results for the domain semantics:
Fact 3.9. U L♦ D.
Fact 3.10. D L♦ U .
We can prove these facts by showing that there is no truth-preserving injection from the indices of U to
those ofD, and vice versa.21 Thus the domain and update semantics are expressively incommensurable—
though both are strictly less expressive than the relational semantics.
20It is also worth noting that not everything in the update framework is definable in terms of acceptance—in particular, the
update treatment of ‘might’ cannot be reformulated in an equivalent way just in terms of the fixed points of its complement.
To see this, let Acc(ϕ) be the set of ϕ’s accept states, i.e. Acc(ϕ) = {c : [[ϕ]]U (c) = c}. In standard extensions of the
update semantics to conjunction and negation, for atomic p, Acc(p ∧ ¬p) = Acc(♦p ∧ ¬p) = {∅}: these sentences
have all the same fixed points, namely, just ∅. But they interact differently with ♦: e.g. ♦(p ∧ ¬p) is only accepted by ∅,
whereas ♦(♦p ∧ ¬p) is accepted by some non-empty sets, namely those which include both p- and p¯-worlds; and so the
update semantics for ♦ cannot be defined just in terms of the accept states of its complement (though see Gillies 2018 for
a variant which can be).
21These facts are particularly interesting in relation to the limited equivalence between the update and domain semantics
proved in Rothschild 2017. See also Rothschild and Yalcin 2015, 2016 for detailed discussion of dynamic semantics and
their relation to static semantics.
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Note, finally, that these relations are all preserved for L♦−, the language which does not allow
stacked ‘might’s. First, we have D L♦− U (the proof is the same as the proof of Fact 3.10). That,
together with Fact 3.5 (that D ≺L♦− R), and the fact that  is transitive (see Fact 3.13 below), shows
that R L♦− U ; otherwise, we would have D L♦− U . Finally, the proof that U L♦ R extends
immediately to L♦−, so we have:
Fact 3.11. U ≺L♦− R.
The last system I will discuss here is the state-based semantics of Hawke and Steinert-Threlkeld
2016.22 The state-based semantics S is very similar to the update semantics, except an index is a single
set of worlds. At any model s ∈ S , an atomic sentence p is true at a set of worlds c just in case, for
every world w ∈ c : vs(p, w) = 1. And a sentence of the form ♦ϕ is true in s just in case ϕ is true in
s in some {w} ⊆ c. The state-based semantics is strictly less expressive than the domain semantics:
Fact 3.12. S ≺L♦ D.
Furthermore, for any language L, L is transitive across semantic theories isomorphic over L; this
follows from Fact 3.13:
Fact 3.13. For any language L and class of semantic theories T isomorphic with respect to L, L is
a partial pre-order over T.
So we also have:
Fact 3.14. S ≺L♦ R.
3.3 Quantified modal languages
The final comparison of expressive power which I will explore here concerns quantified modal lan-
guages. This is a particularly interesting topic for present purposes because epistemic modals embed
in fascinating ways in the scope of quantifiers—ways that have been used to argue against the stan-
dard semantics and in favor of various quantified enrichments of the update semantics. The present
expressibility results can, however, be extended to show that, if we extend all these frameworks to
quantificational languages in the most straightforward way, the expressive hierarchies for the non-
quantified language remain unchanged.
To show this, consider a standard quantificational language L♦v , built out of a vocabulary compris-
ing variables xi : i ∈ N; n-place relation symbolsRni : i ∈ I for every n ≥ 0; and a one-place sentence
operator ♦. L♦v is the smallest set comprising atomic sentences with the form of an n-place relation
22It is a more complicated matter to extend the comparison to the bilateral state-based semantics in Aloni 2016, Steinert-
Threlkeld 2017, Chapter 3.
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symbol Rn followed by an n-tuple of variables; and sentences of the form ♦ϕ, for any ϕ ∈ L♦v . We
can extend the basic relational semantic theoryR to a semantic theoryR∃ for this quantified language
by adding a domain to the semantic theory, and adding a variable assignment (a function from vari-
ables to elements of the domain) to our indices, so that they amount to triples comprising a variable
assignment, accessibility relation, and world. Our valuation function now takes a world and an n-place
relation symbol and returns an n-place relation on the domain. Our truth clauses for atomic sentences
and ♦ will be generalized in the usual way, and our semantics for ♦ remains essentially unchanged.23
We can treat quantifiers as sentence operators (shifting variable assignments, in the usual way) which
we can freely add to our language. We can likewise enrich the domain semantics to a semantic theory
D∃ of L♦v in a parallel fashion, augmenting our indices so they are triples of variable assignments,
information states, and worlds, and extending the interpretation function in the obvious way. It is clear
that these changes do not affect the expressive hierarchy between the domain and relational semantics.
That is, we have:
Fact 3.15. D∃ ≺L♦v R∃.
The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of the parallel result for the non-quantified
case.
Things get more interesting when we turn to the update semantics.24 The most obvious way to
incorporate quantification into the update semantics is to simply treat intensions as functions from a
variable assignment to a function from contexts to contexts (as in Yalcin 2015), so that U∃-indices
have the form 〈a, 〈s, c〉〉, for a a variable assignment and s and c contexts.25 For any model u∃ ∈ U∃,
we say that, for atomic sentence p of the form Rn(〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉), p is trueu∃ at 〈a, 〈s, c〉〉 iff c is the
result of removing from s all and only worlds w such that 〈a(x1), a(x2), . . . a(xn)〉 /∈ vu∃(Rn, w).
And we say that ♦ϕ is trueu∃ at 〈a, 〈s, c〉〉 iff [[ϕ]]u∃(a)(s) 6= ∅ ∧ s = c, or [[ϕ]]R∃(a)(s) = ∅ = c. If
we go this way, then, once again, the expressive hierarchy from above will be preserved: the quantified
update semantics will be strictly less expressive than the quantified relational semantics.
Fact 3.16. U∃ ≺L♦v R∃.
23I.e. for any model r∃ ∈ R∃, where 〈a, f, w〉 is a relational index, with a a variable assignment, f a modal base,
and w a possible world, we say that an atomic sentence of the form Rn(〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉) is truer∃ at 〈a, f, w〉 iff
〈a(x1), a(x2), . . . a(xn)〉 ∈ vr∃(Rn, w), and ♦ϕ is truer∃ at 〈a, f, w〉 iff there is a world w′ ∈ f(w) such that ϕ is
truer∃ at 〈a, f, w′〉.
24I’ll set aside the state-based semantics for now; I don’t know of quantificational versions of that semantics.
25Interestingly, this is not the most common way to incorporate quantification into the dynamic framework in which the
update semantics is cast. In the standard quantified extension of that framework, developed in Heim 1982, 1983, indices
are treated, not as pairs of a variable assignment and a pair of information states, but rather as pairs of ‘files’, where a file
is a set of world/variable assignment pairs. I will not explore the expressive hierarchies that would result from this more
complicated way of going.
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4 The upshot
There is much more to explore here, but I will stop for the present. Let me briefly summarize the
situation, and then emphasize a few upshots of this discussion. The (quantified) domain semantics,
(quantified) update semantics, and state-based semantics are all strictly less expressive than the (quan-
tified) relational semantics with respect to a language comprising ‘might’ and atomic sentences. In
other words, for any way of extending this language with a new set of sentence operators and any way
of extending the domain, update, or state-based semantic theories to give semantics for those opera-
tors, we can extend the relational framework to these operators in a way which exactly replicates the
logic of that operator in the given semantics. But the converse is not true: there are operators defin-
able in the relational framework whose logic cannot be replicated in the domain, update, or state-based
frameworks. This shows that there are no data involving ‘might’ embedded under some operator which
the domain, update, or state-based semantics can make sense of, but which the relational semantics
cannot make sense of.26
This, in turn, sheds new light on the debate about the semantics of epistemic modals. At a high
level, that dialectic has sometimes been presented roughly as follows. First, a conservative assumption
in favor of the relational semantics is generally taken for granted. Then, this assumption is challenged
with data involving ‘might’ embedded under other operators which the relational semantics putatively
has trouble accounting for. Finally, the data are used to advocate a revisionary semantics which can
make sense of them when extended in an appropriate way to give a semantics for the embedding
operator.
The present results show that this gets things backwards. On the one hand, these results show
that there are no embedding data which on their own tell against the relational semantics and in fa-
vor of the domain, update, or state-based semantics. That is, for any embedding data which we can
account for within the domain, update, or state-based semantics by extending those semantics to the
embedding operator(s) in question, we can account for the same data in the relational semantics by
extending the relational semantics in a way which matches the logic of the new operator(s) in the
26Of course, this holds only as long as we focus on sentences where ‘might’ takes as a complement just sentences in our
simple starting language. In fact, of course, ‘might’ can embed sentences of much more complexity. But, as far as the
embedding behavior of epistemic modals goes, this limitation seems to be harmless; all of the data that I know of which
have been used to motivate departures from the relational semantics stay within these bounds. This limitation follows
from the assumption that LO is closed only under the operators in O, and not under the operators in the vocabulary of L.
If we made the latter assumption, we would avoid this limitation, but the proofs below would not go through. Note that
many (but not all) of the results above can be easily extended to more complex starting languages. (See brief discussion in
Footnote 18. In some cases, no such extension will be possible, e.g. if we compare the update and relational semantics with
a starting language which includes conjunction, given its standard entries in these two frameworks. But the comparison
of that result to those above shows that the resulting failure has to do with those entries for conjunction, not with the
semantics for epistemic modals; the results above show that the logical features of the standard update conjunction can be
replicated in the relational framework.)
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domain/update/state-based frameworks. But the converse does not hold, and so there may well be
data which tell the other way: embedding data which the relational framework can make sense of, but
which the domain, update, and state-based frameworks cannot make sense of.
On the other hand, excessive expressive power is to be avoided in giving a semantics for natural
language. So these results also provide the basis for an argument in favor of the revisionary, less
expressive alternatives. If natural language does not make use of the full expressive power of the
relational semantics, we may want to record this fact in our semantic theory. The less expressive a
theory of ‘might’ is, the fewer stipulations are needed to make it match data from natural language.
Thus, if the less expressive frameworks can make sense of the behavior of embedded epistemic modals,
then the present expressibility results show that there should be a simplicity-based prejudice in their
favor. This makes precise the intuition reported by Ninan and others that there is something about the
domain semantics which makes it simpler than the relational semantics.
These considerations are, of course, only pro tanto. There are many other considerations that can
bear on the choice between semantic theories. For instance, one framework may be able to account for
embedding data in a more natural way than another, (for instance, by doing so in a computationally
simpler way; it is important to note that just because T L T ′, it does not follow that T ′ can match
the logic of any extension of T in as computationally simple way as T does).27
Let me put all this a bit more generally, to bring out the utility (and limitations) of comparisons of
potential expressibility. Consider a debate between two semantic theorists about how to make sense
of some fragment of natural language. The first theorist may point to the logical behavior of sentences
in some extension of this fragment as evidence in favor of her theory. The second theorist could
respond by showing that there exists an extension of her preferred theory to that extension which also
captures the logical behavior in question. But the present considerations show that a more general
response is also available to her. If she can show that her theory has greater potential expressibility
than the first theorist’s, then she can show that the first theorist can’t ever win an argument so easily:
whatever extension the first theorist offers up, the second theorist will be able to match the logic of
that extension. This does not decide which theory is correct. For one thing, this very fact, although
it undermines the first theorist’s original argument for her theory, may be taken as a different point
in favor of the first theory, as it shows that there is a precise sense in which the first theory is less
flexible than the second. Second, there may be other, independent considerations which bear on the
choice between the theories. Thus considerations of relative potential expressibility are not decisive,
but they play at least two important roles: they help us determine when an argument based purely on
the logic of some extension of a semantic theory can on its own be an argument in favor of that theory
27Cf. debates in syntax, where more powerful grammars are sometimes preferred simply because of the ease with which
they can capture the data; thanks to Roni Katzir for pointing out this connection.
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and against another; and they help us make precise intuitions about the relative simplicity of theories.
5 The domain versus relational semantics
This concludes my abstract discussion of relative potential expressibility. My plan for this final part of
the paper is to briefly descend from these abstract considerations back into the more concrete debate
about which theory is best able to account for epistemic modals in natural language. My goal is not to
choose between these theories here. I will instead focus on a limited subset of embedding data, making
a case study of the behavior of epistemic modals under attitude predicates. The goal will be to bring
out the kinds of methodological considerations that should be brought to bear in deciding between
different semantic theories in light of expressibility results like those proved above.28
As we saw above, Ninan (2016) shows that we can account for Yalcin’s data in the relational
system. More generally, Ninan’s semantics for attitude predicates, plus the relational semantics, is
in fact equivalent to Yalcin’s system.29 In light of this equivalence, together with the expressibility
results which showed that there is a sense in which the domain semantics is more constrained than the
relational semantics, it would be tempting to conclude that the domain semantics is to be preferred over
the relational semantics, at least modulo considerations about epistemic modals in other environments.
But this would be too fast, because it turns out the predictions of Yalcin’s and Ninan’s systems are
problematic.30
These systems have at least three serious empirical problems. First, as Dorr and Hawthorne (2013)
point out, Yalcin’s system (and hence Ninan’s system) predicts that, for non-modal ϕ and agent A,
the inference from ϕ to pA knows might ϕq will be valid: on these accounts, the latter is true just
in case the truth of ϕ is compatible with A’s knowledge, and any truth is compatible with anyone’s
knowledge. But this is obviously wrong. It is possible to fail to know that some truth might obtain; this
is just what happens when one has a false belief. Suppose John sees Mark enter his office and close the
door. Unbeknownst to John, Mark has a secret exit in the floor of his office, and has used this exit to
leave the office and go to the bar. In this situation, ‘John knows that Mark might be at the bar’ seems
plainly false. But, since Mark is in fact at the bar, the Yalcin/Ninan approach wrongly predicts this to
28In Mandelkern 2019, I explore a much wider variety of embedding data, and give a different response to those data. To
be clear, I stand by the response I give there; the proposals I explore here are local and ad hoc in an entirely unsatisfying
way, and serve a merely illustrative purpose. The ‘bounded theory’ that I develop there builds on the relational theory.
However, as I point out there (Footnote 58), a similar response could be given in a domain framework. For what it’s worth,
my own view is that the relational framework is preferable, but for reasons having to do with higher-level considerations
about communication (which I discuss in Mandelkern (2018a)), not on the basis of embedding data.
29I.e. for any attitude verb V, world w, information state s, and modal base f , pA V’s ϕq is true in Yalcin’s system at an
index 〈s, w〉 just in case it is true in Ninan’s system at the index 〈f, w〉.
30The same problems face the update semantics, when combined with the approach to attitudes in Heim 1992, or the event-
relative modal and attitude semantics of Hacquard 2006, 2010.
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be true.31
The second problem is that the Yalcin/Ninan framework gets the entailment relations between pA
knows might ϕq and pA believes might ϕq backwards. In this framework, the first says that the truth
of ϕ is compatible with A’s knowledge; the latter that it is compatible with A’s beliefs (provided A’s
beliefs are consistent). Since whatever is compatible with someone’s beliefs is compatible with their
knowledge, but not vice versa, this framework predicts that pA knows might ϕq does not entail pA
believes might ϕq; but that, as Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) point out, that pA consistently believes
might ϕq does entail pA knows might ϕq. But this is wrong: just as in the non-modal case, likewise in
the modal case, knowledge entails belief, but not vice versa. Birthers consistently believe that Obama
may have been born in Kenya, but they don’t know this. By contrast, if John knows Mark may be in
his office, then he also believes this; ‘John knows Mark might be in his office, but he doesn’t believe
Mark might be in his office’ has the same sense of incoherence as in the non-modal case.32
The final problem for the Yalcin/Ninan system is that it predicts that ‘must’ is vacuous under
attitudes.33 That is, sentences with the form pA V’s must ϕq and pA V’s ϕq are predicted to be
semantically equivalent: modals embedded under an attitude verb are predicted only to contribute
quantificational force, and since the universal quantificational force of ‘must’ matches the universal
quantificational force of the embedding predicate, ‘must’ is predicted to have no effect. This predic-
tion, however, is wrong. A construction with the form pA knows/believes must ϕq is generally only
felicitous if A’s evidence for the truth of ϕ is in some sense indirect.34 For instance—to modify a stock
example—suppose that Sue is watching it rain, and on this basis concludes that it’s raining out. Then
we can say ‘Sue knows/believes it’s raining’, but the ‘must’-variant ‘Sue knows/believes it must be
raining’ is quite odd. By contrast, suppose that Sue can’t see outside, but sees some of her colleagues
come inside with wet umbrellas, and on this basis concludes that it’s raining out. Then either the
‘must’ or non-modal variant is acceptable. There are many kinds of explanation we might seek out for
31Yalcin (2012) discusses this problem in the context of the update framework. A referee for this journal helpfully points
out that this prediction of the Yalcin/Ninan system would be palatable if there were some reading of ‘knows’ on which
the inference from ϕ to pA knows might ϕq looks valid. If there were, then sequences like the following should have a
coherent reading: ‘Susie is completely convinced that it’s sunny out; she is, after all, looking out at what appears to be a
sunny sky. But she knows that it might be raining out, because in fact it’s raining out, and the apparently sunny sky is just
a clever projection.’ On any reading, the last sentence here sounds like a non sequitur.
32See Hawthorne et al. (2016); Bledin and Lando (2017); Beddor and Goldstein (2018) for discussion of related cases.
A referee for this journal helpfully points out that these first two problem stem from the same logical feature of the
Yalcin/Ninan system: that on that system, pA consistently believes/knows ϕq is equivalent to pϕ is consistent with A’s
beliefs/knowledgeq. These problems are, nonetheless, distinct, and are important to keep separate because it is possible to
solve one problem without solving the other (as we will see presently).
33Assuming ‘must’ is defined as the dual of ‘might’, with negation given its standard Boolean meaning. This follows from
the more general problem that to accept ϕ and to accept pMust ϕq amount to the same thing in this system, a problem
Hacquard 2010, §6.1.2 discusses.
34This generalizes a common parallel observation about unembedded ‘must’; see Karttunen 1972; Veltman 1985; Kratzer
1991; von Fintel and Gillies 2010; Kratzer 2012; Matthewson 2015; Lassiter 2016; Giannakidou and Mari 2016; Sherman
2018; Mandelkern 2017b, 2018b. For specific discussion of embedded ‘must’ see Ippolito 2017.
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this difference, including broadly pragmatic explanations, but it is hard to see how the Yalcin/Ninan
systems could provide the foundation for any such explanation, since, on this approach, the ‘must’ and
non-modal variants are, again, semantically equivalent.35
The Yalcin/Ninan system is thus not empirically viable. Yalcin’s and Ninan’s system show us
how to respond to Yalcin’s data within a domain and relational semantics, respectively. In both cases,
those responses have implausible results. The expressibility results above showed that the relational
semantics has more expressive power than any of the alternative views we explored. The implausibility
of the Yalcin/Ninan system may appear to show that we need an even more expressive semantics than
the relational one in order to have the flexibility to account for Yalcin’s data in a plausible way.
But this would be too fast. The main point which I wish to make in this section is that reason-
ing like this would only be valid if Yalcin’s and Ninan’s systems were the weakest ways one could
possibly account for Yalcin’s data in the domain and relational frameworks, respectively. If this were
so, then things would look very bad indeed for those frameworks: we would know that any way those
frameworks could account for Yalcin’s data will validate the implausible inferences just reviewed. This
would, in turn, provide sufficient motivation to reject those theories and pursue a new, more expres-
sive theory of epistemic modals. But, by contrast, if Yalcin’s and Ninan’s systems do not represent the
weakest ways to respond to Yalcin’s data within the domain and relational frameworks, respectively,
then the failure of the Yalcin/Ninan systems tells us nothing about the viability of those frameworks.
More generally, my point is the following: when faced with new data, the only way to show that a
semantic system is incapable of making sense of those data is by looking at the weakest way that sys-
tem can account for the data. It is only if the weakest possible account of the data within that system
validates implausible entailments that we know we need a more expressive underlying system, rather
than simply a different way of responding to the data within that system.
And it turns out that the Yalcin/Ninan system is not the weakest way to account for Yalcin’s data,
within either the relational or domain frameworks. In both cases, there are much weaker constraints
available, which account for Yalcin’s data and avoid the problems just enumerated. To show this,
35It may look as though these data can be explained in a relatively conservative way within a close variant of the Yalcin/Ninan
approach by adopting a presupposition of indirectness along the lines suggested by von Fintel and Gillies (2010). But,
first, to do this, we would have to depart substantively from the domain semantics, since information states do not provide
enough structure to formulate a presupposition like the one von Fintel and Gillies propose; on that proposal, modals
are evaluated relative to a set of propositions (representing an agent’s direct evidence), and presuppose that no single
element of the set entails the modal’s prejacent or its negation. Even if we modify the domain semantics so that the von
Fintel and Gillies proposal is statable, Ippolito (2017) gives convincing arguments that indirectness does not project like
a presupposition, and so should not be encoded as a presupposition at all (nor will we have better luck encoding it as a
conventional implicature, which would face the same objections). I am inclined to think instead that a pragmatic view like
the one that I develop in Mandelkern (2017b, 2018b) is more plausible (cf. Degen et al. 2015). But that approach crucially
requires that there be a difference in truth conditions between ‘must’ sentences and corresponding non-modal sentences,
and so cannot get off the ground if pA V’s must ϕq is semantically equivalent to pA V’s ϕq. There are, of course, pragmatic
accounts which distinguish sentences which are semantically equivalent, but I do not see a natural account to apply to the
present case. In any case, the first two two points alone provide motivation to look for alternatives.
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I will explore what the weakest constraint is in each framework which accounts for these data. To
make this discussion tractable, I will make two background assumptions: first, that our connectives
are the standard Boolean ones;36 second, that attitudes are represented as sets of possible worlds, in
the broadly Hintikkan framework that Ninan and Yalcin both assume—i.e. that attitude predicates
have as their core semantic values universal quantifiers over accessible worlds. There may be reasons
to relax both these assumptions, but they facilitate the present discussion, and are harmless as far as
present purposes are concerned.
Given all this, the weakest constraint in the relational framework which suffices to account for
Yalcin’s data—that is, to ensure that pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q entails that A’s suppositions
are inconsistent—is the following: provided A’s suppositions are consistent, then some supposition
world can only access other supposition worlds. We can schematically encode this constraint, which
I’ll call the subset relational constraint, as follows:
Definition 5.1. Subset attitude semantics, relational version:
• [[A V’s ϕ]]f,w
a. defined only if VA,w 6= ∅→ ∃w′ ∈ VA,w : f(w′) ⊆ VA,w subset relational constraint
b. where defined, true iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[ϕ]]f,w′ = 1 standard Hintikkan truth conditions
To see that this constraint is necessary and sufficient to account for Yalcin’s data in the relational
framework, given our background assumptions, first assume that pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q is
true; then we know that (i) all of A’s suppositions worlds make ϕ true (relative to f ), and (ii) all of
A’s suppositions worlds can access a world where ϕ is false (relative to f ). But the subset relational
constraint ensures that, if A’s suppositions are consistent, then one of A’s supposition worlds can only
access other supposition worlds. It follows that (i) and (ii) are only both satisfied when there are no
worlds compatible with A’s suppositions. Note next that the subset relational constraint is necessary
to account for Yalcin’s data, given our background assumptions: if the constraint is violated, then pA
supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q will not entail that A’s suppositions are inconsistent. Suppose that
A’s suppositions are consistent at w, and the subset relational constraint is violated for some modal
base f : that is, SA,w is non-empty, and ∀w′ ∈ SA,w : f(w′) \ SA,w 6= ∅. Let ϕ denote SA,w.37
By construction, every world in SA,w is a ϕ-world, and every world in SA,w will be able to access a
world under f where ϕ is false. Thus pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q is true at w, even though A’s
suppositions at w are consistent.
36While adopting non-standard connectives could on its own explain Yalcin’s data (as Rothschild and Klinedinst (2015);
Mandelkern (2019) discuss) it would not on its own account for nearby order and scope variants.
37It will generally be possible to come up with a sentence that denotes the content of an attitude state in natural language:
e.g. just let ϕ =‘What A V’s at w’.
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Thus, given our background assumptions, the subset relational constraint is the weakest constraint
which accounts for Yalcin’s data in the relational framework. The first thing to note about this con-
straint is that it is much weaker than the constraint implicit in Ninan’s system—that modal bases must
be constant functions to the set of attitude world. And thus the relational semantics is by no means
locked into the Yalcin/Ninan approach if it is to make sense of Yalcin’s data.
Before exploring the plausibility of the subset relational system (the system that results from the
relational semantics together with the subset attitude semantics), let us explore the parallel question
for the domain semantics. It turns out that there is no way to exactly replicate the subset relational
system in the domain framework, given our background assumptions:38 something which is unsur-
prising, given the greater expressive power of the relational framework, and which provides a helpful
concrete illustration of those expressibility results. But neither is the domain semantics locked into the
Yalcin/Ninan framework. The weakest constraint in the domain framework which accounts for Yal-
cin’s data is the following: a modal in the complement of pA supposesq is always evaluated relative
to a subset of A’s supposition worlds. A simple way to encode this constraint, which I call the subset
domain constraint, is as follows:39
Definition 5.2. Subset attitude semantics, domain version:
• [[A V’s ϕ]]s,w
a. defined only if s ⊆ VA,w subset domain constraint
b. where defined, true iff ∀w′ ∈ VA,w : [[ϕ]]s,w′ = 1 standard Hintikkan truth conditions
Given this constraint, if pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q is true at 〈s, w〉, then (i) all the worlds
compatible with A’s suppositions in w make ϕ true (relative to s); and (ii) all the worlds compatible
with A’s suppositions are such that some world in smakes ϕ false (relative to s). These two conditions
can only be jointly met if there are no worlds compatible with A’s suppositions. Next suppose that A’s
suppositions are consistent atw, and that the subset domain constraint is violated for some information
state s, i.e. s \ SA,w 6= ∅. Let ϕ denote SA,w. Then pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q will be true
at 〈s, w〉, since (i) all of A’s supposition world are ϕ-worlds; and (ii) some world in s makes ϕ-false,
since s \SA,w is non-empty and by construction includes only p¬ϕq-worlds. So, if the subset domain
constraint is violated, pA supposes (ϕ and might not ϕ)q can be true even if A’s suppositions are
consistent.
38The proof follows from the fact that, given our background assumptions and given any semantics for attitudes, the domain
framework will validate the inference from pA V’s might (ϕ or ψ)q to p(A V’s might ϕ) or (A V’s might ψ)q; but this
inference is invalid in the subset relational framework. See Stalnaker 1984; Yalcin 2011 for criticism of one prediction of
this inference pattern: that pA believes might ϕ or A believes might ¬ϕq is a logical truth.
39A different route to an approach which ends up being essentially equivalent to the subset domain semantics goes by adding
an ordering source to Hacquard (2010)’s event-relative semantics; see Hacquard 2010, §6.1.2 for a brief discussion of this
possibility.
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Thus, given our background assumptions, the subset domain constraint is the weakest constraint
which accounts for Yalcin’s data in the domain framework. And, once more, this constraint is much
weaker than the one relied on in Yalcin’s framework—that modals under attitudes are evaluated rela-
tive to exactly the set of attitude worlds. Thus the domain semantics, like the relational semantics, is
not locked into the Yalcin/Ninan approach if it is to make sense of Yalcin’s data.
The key question at this stage is whether the subset relational or subset domain systems improves
over the Yalcin/Ninan systems. Strikingly, both do (albeit to varying degrees). First, both approaches
predict that non-modal ϕ does not entail pA knows might ϕq, avoiding the most serious problem for
the Yalcin/Ninan system: this is because, on both approaches, pA knows might ϕq is strictly stronger
than pϕ is compatible with A’s knowledgeq. Second, both approaches, unlike the Yalcin/Ninan ap-
proach, predict that pA knows might ϕq Strawson entails pA believes might ϕq (in the terminology
of von Fintel 1997): whenever both sentences are well-defined, if the first is true, the second is as
well (holding fixed the modal base/information state parameter). The subset relational approach also
correctly predicts that pA consistently believes might ϕq does not entail pA knows might ϕq; by con-
trast, the subset domain approach still wrongly predicts this entailment is Strawson valid. Finally, both
approaches predict that pA V’s must ϕq and pA V’s ϕq are not semantically equivalent: the subset
relational approach predicts that neither entails the other, while the subset domain approach predicts
that the latter entails the former, but not vice versa (in both cases, there is much more to be done to
marshal these facts into an explanation of how ‘must’ patterns under attitude verbs, but this is a clear
improvement over the Yalcin/Ninan prediction that pA V’s must ϕq is semantically equivalent to pA
V’s ϕq).
The subset domain system is less attractive than the subset relational system with respect to its
predictions about the relation between belief and knowledge. But there is much more to explore be-
fore we come to any conclusion here; in particular, we must, among other things, explore alternative
approaches which relax the two background assumptions we have made here.40 The goal of the present
excursus is not to decide between the domain and relational approaches, but rather to emphasize that,
in deciding whether some embedding data show that a given semantic framework is not expressively
powerful enough to make sense of natural language, we must always explore the weakest constraint
within that framework which makes sense of those data. It is only if that constraint makes implau-
sible commitments that the data truly tell against the framework in question. In the present case,
these considerations showed that there are much weaker ways to account for Yalcin’s data in both the
domain and relational framework than with the implausible Yalcin/Ninan framework. These weaker
40Again, in Mandelkern (2019), I explore a system which abandons Boolean semantics for the connectives. In a different
direction, Beaver 1992, 2001; Rothschild 2011; Yalcin 2012; Willer 2013 develop systems which avoid the first two of
these problems by treating attitude states, not as sets of worlds, but as sets of sets of worlds. Those approaches avoid
the first and second problems raised here, though they still face the third problem: they predict that pA V’s must ϕq is
semantically equivalent to pA V’s ϕq, at least within any eliminative fragment like the ones they are working with.
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approaches are both much more plausible than the Yalcin/Ninan system, and thus these embedding
data do not, after all, tell against either framework as a candidate semantics for epistemic modals.
Let me conclude by pointing to a more indirect upshot of this discussion. The domain semantics
has a substantially stronger logic than the relational semantics; in particular, enriched with standard
classical treatments of the connectives, the domain semantics validates the logic K45 (or S5, if we
also impose a reflexivity constraint by assuming that, for all domain indices 〈s, w〉, w ∈ s)41 whereas
the relational system validates just the much weaker logic K (again, unless we assume a reflexivity
constraint (as I have not), in which case we would have a T logic). Interestingly, Ninan’s system,
although it adopts the relational semantics, still validates K45 in a local sense: the axioms of K45 will
be valid in the scope of an attitude verb. This may make it look as though Yalcin’s data are really an
argument for K45: we could validate K45 directly by adopting the domain semantics, or indirectly (in
a local way) by adopting Ninan’s semantics, but either way, we must validate K45, at least in the scope
of attitude predicates, if we are to make sense of the data. But the subset relational approach shows
this is wrong: it is mere happenstance that the most prominent treatments of the data both validate
this strong logic (at least in the scope of attitude predicates), for the subset relational approach does
not validate K45 even for modals in the scope of attitude verbs (e.g. on this approach, pA believes
might pq can be true without pA believes must (might p)q being true, and pA believes must pq can
be true without pA believes must (must p)q being true). And so we can make sense of Yalcin’s data
without validating K45 even in a local sense. This shows that—even though (I have argued) there is
an argument for the domain semantics on the basis of its expressive weakeness—there is no argument
from Yalcin’s data for the domain semantics on the basis of its stronger logic, which turns out to
be strictly orthogonal to accounting for those data. (There may, of course, be other arguments that
we want a stronger logic for epistemic modals than K; my present point is simply that the present
discussion shows that Yalcin’s embedding data do not provide such arguments.)
6 Conclusion
I have argued that we can gain new insight into controversies about the semantics of natural lan-
guage expressions by taking an abstract perspective on the potential expressive power of different
semantic theories. I have developed a formal framework to make these comparisons precise, and have
used this framework to explore the relative potential expressive power of different semantics for epis-
temic modals. These comparisons show that, for any embedding operator which can be defined in
the domain, update, or state-based semantics, a corresponding operator can be defined in a relational
framework, but not conversely. This shows that the dialectic in this debate is roughly the opposite of
41See Schultz 2010; Holliday and Icard 2017.
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what it has often been taken to be. On the one hand, the relational theory can do anything that these
revisionary theories can do, showing that it is not defenders of the relational framework who must
fight rearguard actions when new data are discovered, but rather defenders of the revisionary frame-
works who must show that those frameworks have the expressive power to account for those data. But,
on the other hand, the relative expressive weakness of the domain, update, and state-based semantics
provides powerful pro tanto considerations in their favor. In the last part of the paper, I explored the
comparison between the relational and domain frameworks in light of these results, focusing on the
behavior of modals under attitudes. I emphasized there the importance of methodological parsimony
in choosing between semantic frameworks: the only way to see whether a given semantic framework
has the expressive power to account for some new domain of data is by finding the weakest way the
framework can do so, and then asking if the result makes implausible commitments.
I have focused on epistemic modals here because they provide an apt illustration of the utility of the
expressive comparisons I have developed. While I hope this discussion has advanced our understand-
ing of the meaning of epistemic modals, my broader goal has been to develop a formal framework with
widespread application in semantics. Semantic theory has often advanced thanks to results regarding
expressive power—for instance in the theory of tense and temporal adverbs,42 or of generalized quanti-
fiers.43 The framework for comparing relative potential expressibility introduced here makes precise a
new kind of question we can ask about the expressive power of different semantic frameworks, and the
characterization result proved shows how to straightforwardly answer those questions. There is much
more work to do in exploring the applications of this framework, as well as exploring and extending
the underlying formalism. Of particular interest is a set of questions about computational complexity:
if T L T ′, that means that, for any operator we can give a semantics for in T , we can replicate that
operator’s logic in an extension of T ′, but this does not tell us anything about the relationship between
the complexity of T ′ to the complexity of T . Ideally, we would like to know whether we can replicate
all operators from possible extensions of T without an upgrade in computational complexity.
I believe this work will pay handsome dividends. Potential expressibility results cannot on their
own determine which of two semantic theories is correct, but they can clarify the dialectical relation-
ship in which competing theories stand, thus clarifying what kinds of evidence we can expect to find
for and against them based on embedding data, and making precise one sense in which a theory can
be simpler than another.
42See Kamp 1970; Cresswell 1990.
43See Peters and Westersta˚hl (2008, Parts 3-4) for an overview.
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A Definitions and proofs
In this appendix I give definitions of the technical terms used in §3, and provide proofs of the claims made there.
A.1 Definitions
Definition A.1. Languages, Models, Semantic theories: Given a propositional language L, built from a vocab-
ulary comprising a set A of atomic sentences p, q, r . . . and sentence operators O, and comprising only (and
typically all) (i) atoms from A, and (ii) strings of the form On(〈ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn〉) for any n-place sentence oper-
ator On ∈ O and sentences ϕi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n in L,44 a modelM of L is a sequence 〈W, v,I, [[·]]〉, whereW is a
non-empty set of possible worlds (any set); v is an atomic valuation function, which takes any atomic sentence
of L and any possible world fromW to either 1 (“true”) or 0 (“false”), and which takes any atomic sentence of
L to the subset ofW where that sentence is true; and I is a non-empty set of indices (again, any set). [[·]] is an
interpretation function for L which takes an atomic sentence to a set of indices in the model; takes an n-place
sentence operator On to a function from an n-tuple of sets of indices to a set of indices; take any sentence of
the form On(〈ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕn〉), for any n-place sentence operator On ∈ O and any n-tuple 〈ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn〉 of
sentences of L, to [[On]](〈[[ϕ1]], [[ϕ2]] . . . [[ϕn]]〉); and which is otherwise undefined. For convenience, we also
stipulate that [[·]] takes any sentence ϕ of L and any index i (written [[ϕ]]i) to 1 just in case i ∈ [[ϕ]], and otherwise
to 0. Finally, a semantic theory T of L is a non-empty set of models of L.
Given a quantified language Lv , built from a vocabulary comprising a set V of variables x1, x2, . . . , a set
R of relation symbols, and a set O of sentence operators; and comprising only (and typically all) (i) atoms of
the form Rn(〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉), for Rn an n-place relation in R, and xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n variables from V; and
(ii) strings of the form On(〈ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn〉) for any n-place sentence operator On ∈ O and any sentences
ϕi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n in Lv , a model of Lv is just like a model of a propositional language, except it also includes
a domain D of individuals, and the atomic valuation function takes a possible world and an n-place relation
symbol to an n-place relation (a subset of Dn, the set of n-tuples of elements of D). Interpretation functions
and semantic theories are constructed as for propositional languages.
Definition A.2. Extension of a Language: Given a language L, and a set O of sentence operators disjoint from
the vocabulary of L,45 the extension of L to O, written LO, is the smallest set containing L and closed under
the elements of O, i.e. where a is the function giving the arity of sentence operators, the smallest set containing
L such that if O ∈ O, a(O) = n, and l ∈ (LO)n, then On(l) ∈ LO.
Definition A.3. Extension of a model and semantic theory: Given a language L, a modelM of L, and an ex-
tension LO of L, an extensionMO ofM to an interpretation of LO with respect to L is an interpretation which
is exactly likeM except with respect to its interpretation function, which must agree withM’s interpretation
function on sentences of L, i.e. ∀ϕ ∈ L : [[ϕ]]M ⊆ [[ϕ]]MO . Given a semantic theory T of L, an extension T O
of T to LO is a semantic theory each of whose members extends some model in T from L to LO such that any
two models in T O agree on the logic of O.46
44We will generally use lower-case italic letters to range over atoms, and Greek letters to range over all sentences.
45I will call any set of operators which meets this novelty constraint a ‘set of new operators’; I sometimes leave this novelty
condition implicit for brevity in introducing extensions of languages.
46I will usually leave the relativization to the initial language implicit. For any modelM, I write [[·]]M forM’s interpretation
function, and likewise for its other parameters.
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A.2 Proofs
For convenience, I repeat the definition of relative potential expressibility here; I then turn to proofs of the
claims of §3:
Definition 3.1. Relative Potential Expressibility: For any semantic theories T and T ′ of a language L, T L T ′
iff, for any set of new operators O, for any extension T O of T to LO, there is an extension T ′O of T ′ to LO
which agrees with T O on logic ofO: that is, which is such that, for any Γ ⊆ LO such that ∃ϕ ∈ Γ : ϕ ∈ LO\L,
and for any sentence ψ in LO, (Γ T O ψ) ↔ (Γ T ′O ψ). For a set of sentences Γ, sentence ψ, and semantic
theory T , Γ T ψ iff for every modelM∈ T , Γ M ψ iff every index inM which makes all the sentences in
Γ true also makes ψ true.
We also define a derivative notion of relative expressibility between models: for any modelsM andM′ of a
language L,M L M′ iff, for any set of new operators O, for any extensionMO ofM to LO, there is an
extension M′O of M′ to LO which preserves the logic of O from MO: that is, which is such that, for any
Γ ⊆ LO such that ∃ϕ ∈ Γ : ϕ ∈ LO \ L, and for any sentence ψ in LO, (Γ MO ψ)↔ (Γ M′O ψ).
The proof of Fact 3.1 goes by way of two lemmas:
Lemma A.1. For any modelsM andM′ of a language L,M L M′ iff for any extension LO of L with a
set of new operators, and any extensionMO ofM to a model of LO, there is an extensionM′O ofM′ to LO
such that there exists a function g from the indices ofM to the indices ofM′ such that for any sentence ϕ of
LO and index i inM, ϕ is true at i inMO iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′O.
Proof. [⇒] For arbitrary models M and M′ of an arbitrary language L, suppose M L M′. Recall that
means that, for any set of new operators O and any extensionMO ofM to LO, there is an extensionM′O of
M′ to LO which preserves the logic ofO fromMO. Consider an arbitrary set of new operatorsO and arbitrary
extension MO of M to LO. We will show that there is an extension M′ON of M′ to LO such that there is a
function g from the indices ofM to the indices ofM′ such that for any sentence ϕ of LO and index i inM, ϕ
is true at i inMO iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′ON .
We do so by way of considering first a different extended language which contains LO, and a different
extension ofMwhich also extendsMO. In particular, consider the extension ofL toO∪N , whereO∩N = ∅,
no operator in N is in the vocabulary of L, and the cardinality of N is greater than the cardinality of the set of
indices ofM (if that set is finite) or equal in cardinality to the set of indices ofM (if that set is infinite). Now
extendM to a new modelMON of the resulting language, LO∪N , with the following properties:
(a) MON is an extension ofMO, so that ∀ϕ ∈ LO : [[ϕ]]MO = [[ϕ]]MON , and the indices ofM
O
N are the same
as the indices ofMO;
(b) for some sentence ψ ∈ LO∪N , for each index i of M, there is an O ∈ N , call it Oi, which uniquely
specifies i, in the sense that Oi(ψ) is true at i inMON and false everywhere else inMON ; and
(c) for some unary sentence operator ¬ ∈ N , ¬ is given the classical semantics of negation inMON , i.e. for
any ϕ ∈ LO∪N , ¬(ϕ) is trueMON at i iff ϕ is not trueMON at i.
Now extendM′ to a modelM′ON of LO∪N which preserves the logic of O ∪ N fromMON ; we know this
will be possible by our assumption thatMLM′. Now, define a function g such that, for any index i inMON ,
g takes i to an index g(i) inM′ON such that (i) Oi(ψ) is true at g(i) inM′ON and (ii) some sentence in LO∪N
is false at g(i). We know there is such an index; otherwise, we would have Oi(ψ) M′ON ¬(Oi(ψ)), and thus
Oi(ψ) MON ¬(Oi(ψ)), but we know the latter is false by our semantics for Oi and ¬ inMON .
Now for any sentence ϕ of LO∪N :
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• Suppose first ϕ is true at i inMON . ThenOi(ψ) MON ϕ, and thus by our assumption thatOi has the same
logic inM′ON as inMON , Oi(ψ) M′ON ϕ, and thus ϕ is true at g(i), since Oi(ψ) is true at g(i).
• Suppose next that ϕ is not true at i in MON . Then ¬ϕ is true at i in MON , and thus Oi(ψ) MON ¬ϕ
and thus Oi(ψ) M′ON ¬ϕ, and thus ¬ϕ is true at g(i) inM′ON , since Oi(ψ) is true at g(i). Thus we can
conclude that ϕ is not true at g(i) inM′ON ; if it were, since our logic for negation is classical inMON ,
and thus inM′ON , we would have that everything is true at g(i) inM′ON , contrary to assumption.
Thus for any ϕ in LO∪N , we have ϕ true at i inMON iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′ON ; thus in particular, for any
ϕ in LO, which is a subset of LO∪N , ϕ is true at i inMON iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′ON ; and, sinceMON is an
extension ofMO, it follows that for any ϕ in LO, ϕ is true at i inMO iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′ON . Since O
andMO were selected arbitrarily, this shows that, for any extension LO of L and extensionMO ofM, we can
find an extension ofM′ to LO with the property that there is a function from the indices ofM to those ofM′
which preserves truth and falsity for the sentences of LO in the extended models.
[⇐] For arbitrary modelsM andM′ of an arbitrary language L, suppose that, for any arbitrary extension LO
of L with a set of sentence operators, and any arbitrary extension MO of M to a model of LO, there is an
extensionM′O ofM′ to LO such that there exists a function g from the indices ofM to the indices ofM′
such that for any sentence ϕ ∈ LO and index i inM, ϕ is true at i inMO iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′O. We
can use this fact to construct a new extensionM′O− ofM′ which matches the logic of O inMO, as follows.
Let M′O− be just like M′O, except that, at every index i of M′O which is not in the image of g, for any
sentence ϕ ∈ LO \ L, ϕ is false at i inM′O− (we can do this because the truth of ϕ at i will depend just on the
semantics we give to our new operators, since if ϕ is in LO \ L, it must by definition of LO have an operator
from O with highest scope in the sentence). Note thatM′O− is still an extension ofM′ to LO; and g will still
preserve truth for the relevant sentences: since we did not change the truth of any sentences in the image of g,
for any ϕ ∈ LO, ϕ is trueMO iff ϕ is trueM′O− at g(i).47 Now suppose that Γ MO ψ for (Γ ∪ {ψ}) ⊆ LO,
and that ∃ϕ ∈ Γ : ϕ ∈ LO \ L. Then by the fact that g preserves truth for sentences of LO between MO
andM′O−, we have that, within the image of g, ψ is trueM′O− everywhere that all the members of Γ are; and
by construction we have that one member of Γ, namely ϕ, is falseM′O− everywhere outside of the image of g;
and so Γ M′O− ψ. Likewise suppose that Γ 2MO ψ; then there is some i where all of Γ is trueMO and ψ is
falseMO , and so at g(i) all of Γ is trueM′O− with ψ is falseM′O− , and thus we have Γ 2M′O− ψ. Thus we have
(Γ MO ψ)↔ (Γ M′O− ψ). Since this construction was perfectly general, it shows that, under our assumption,
for any extensionMO ofM to an extension LO of L, we can find an extension ofM′ to LO which matches
the logic of O inMO, and soMLM′.
We turn to our second lemma:
Lemma A.2. Characterization of Model Expressibility: For any modelsM andM′ and language L,M L
M′ iff there is a function g (call it a witness function with respect to L) from the indices ofM to those ofM′
which is such that (i) for any sentence ϕ of L and index i inM, ϕ is true at i inM iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′;
and (ii) g is an injection.
Proof. [⇒] Suppose for arbitraryM,M′ and L, there is no function g from the indices ofM to those ofM′
which is such that (i) for any sentence ϕ of L and index i inM, ϕ is true at i inM iff ϕ is true at g(i) inM′;
and (ii) g is an injection. Find a set of new operators O with cardinality equal to the set of indices inM. Let
f be a bijection from the indices ofM to O. ExtendM to a new modelMO of LO, with the property that,
for any index i inM, for any sentence ϕ ∈ LO, f(i)(ϕ) is trueMO at i and falseMO at every other index of
47‘TrueM’ is shorthand for ‘true inM’.
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M; that is, f(i) “tags” i inMO. Now consider an arbitrary extensionM′O ofM′. Suppose there is a function
g from the indices of M to the indices of M′ with the property that, for all ϕ ∈ LO, ϕ is trueMO at i iff
ϕ is trueM′O at g(i). Since L ⊂ LO, and since extensions of models of a given language preserve truth for
sentences in the original language, we know that, for all ϕ ∈ L, ϕ is trueM at i iff ϕ is trueM′ at g(i). Then it
follows from our assumption that g is not an injection: for someM-indices i and i′ with i 6= i′, g(i) = g(i′).
Choose some ϕ ∈ LO. We know by construction ofMO that f(i)(ϕ) is trueMO at i and falseMO at i′. But,
since g(i) = g(i′), f(i)(ϕ) will either be trueM′O at both g(i) and g(i′), or false at both, and thus it will not
be the case that, for every sentence ϕ of LO, if ϕ is true at i inMO, then ϕ is true at g(i) inM′O, contrary
to assumption. Thus, sinceM′O was chosen arbitrarily, there is no extension ofM′ to LO such that there is a
function which preserves truth and falsity for all sentences in LO betweenMO andM′O; and thus by Lemma
A.1,M LM′.
[⇐] Suppose, for arbitraryM,M′ and L, there is such a truth-preserving injection g. Given an arbitrary set
O of sentence operators and an arbitrary extensionMO ofM to LO, we show there is an extensionM′O of
M′ to LO which has the property that, for any sentence ϕ ∈ LO, ϕ is true at an index i inMO just in case
ϕ is true at g(i) inM′O. Let K index the elements of O. For each Ok : k ∈ K, extendM to the modelMk
which is just likeM, except its interpretation function [[·]]Mk is augmented with the semantic rule for Ok from
[[·]]MO . Then, for eachOk, extendM′ to the modelM′k which augments the interpretation function ofM′ with
a semantic rule for Ok as follows. For brevity, for any set α and function f , define f [α] to be the pointwise
application of f to α where defined, i.e. f [α] = {f(a) : a ∈ α ∧ f(a) is defined}. Let g−1 be the inverse of
g, defined only on the image of g; that g−1 is a well-defined function follows because g is an injection. Now,
suppose first that Ok is a unary sentence operator; then letM′k extendM′ with the following semantic rule:
[[Ok]]M′k = λsM′ .g[[[Ok]]Mk(g
−1[s])], where sM′ ranges over sets ofM′ indices. Thus inM′k, Ok takes a set
ofM′ indices; then finds the pre-image (where defined) of this complement with respect to g; then applies the
semantic rule for Ok inMk to this pre-image; and finally, returns the pointwise application of g to the resulting
set. Now note that, for any set s ofM-indices and set s′ ofM′-indices, if i ∈ s ↔ g(i) ∈ s′, it follows that
i ∈ [[Ok]]Mk(s)↔ g(i) ∈ [[Ok]]M′k(s
′). To see this, assume for arbitrary s and s′ that i ∈ s↔ g(i) ∈ s′. Now
note that s = g−1[s′]: if i ∈ s, then by assumption g(i) ∈ s′, and thus g−1[s′] will include i, by construction;
and if i /∈ s, then by assumption g(i) /∈ s′, and since g−1 is an injection, by construction, we know that
i /∈ g−1[s′]. We thus have [[Ok]]M′k(s
′) = g[[[Ok]]Mk(g
−1[s′])] = g[[[Ok]]Mk(s)]. In other words, whenever
i ∈ s↔ g(i) ∈ s′, then [[Ok]]M′k(s
′) is just the pointwise application of g to [[Ok]]Mk(s), and thus, since g is an
injection, i ∈ [[Ok]]Mk(s) ↔ g(i) ∈ [[Ok]]M′k(s
′). The generalization of this construction to n-place sentence
operators, for any n, is straightforward. We use this method to constructM′k for all k ∈ K.
Now, whereM′ = 〈W, I, v, [[·]]M′〉 or 〈D,W, I, v, [[·]]M′〉, letM′O =
〈
W, I, v, ⋃
k∈K
[[·]]M′k
〉
or〈
D,W, I, v, ⋃
k∈K
[[·]]M′k
〉
, respectively. By our construction, we know that for any O ∈ O and any sets of
M-indices s and M′-indices s′ such that i ∈ s ↔ g(i) ∈ s′, [[O]]M′O (s′) = g[[[O]]MO (s)], and thus i ∈
[[O]]MO (s) ↔ g(i) ∈ [[O]]M′O (s′). We know by assumption that, for all sentences ϕ ∈ L, i ∈ [[ϕ]]M ↔
g(i) ∈ [[ϕ]]M′ , and thus (since extending a model never changes its interpretation of a sentence already in the
language of the original model) i ∈ [[ϕ]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[ϕ]]M′O . Now consider any sequence of sentences ~ψ
with the property that for each ψj in the sequence, i ∈ [[ψj ]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[ψj ]]M′O . Then we know that, by our
construction, for any k ∈ K and index i ofM, i ∈ [[Ok(~ψ)]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[Ok(~ψ)]]M′O . Since the sentences
of LO are built recursively from the sentences of L and the operators in O, it follows by an induction on the
complexity of formulae that, for any ϕ ∈ LO, i ∈ [[ϕ]]MO ↔ g(i) ∈ [[ϕ]]M′O . Since O andMO were chosen
arbitrarily, we conclude that, for any set of new operators O, for any extensionMO ofM to LO, there is an
extensionM′O ofM′ to LO such that there is a function g with the property that, for any sentence ϕ ∈ LO, ϕ
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is true at an index i inMO just in case ϕ is true at g(i) inM′O; and thus by Lemma A.1,MLM′.
We turn now to our proof of Fact 3.1:
Fact 3.1. Characterization of Expressibility: For any semantic theories T and T ′ and language L, if T is
isomorphic with respect to L, and T ′ is isomorphic with respect to L, then T L T ′ iff there is a modelM∈ T
and a modelM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a witness function g from the indices ofM to those ofM′ with respect
to L. A semantic theory T is isomorphic with respect to L iff ∀M,M′ ∈ T :MLM′ ∧M′ LM.
Proof. For abitrary semantic theories T , T ′, and language L, suppose that T and T ′ are both isomorphic with
respect to L:
[⇒]: Suppose there is no pair of modelsM ∈ T andM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a witness function g from the
indices ofM to those ofM′. It follows by Lemma A.2 that for any modelsM∈ T andM′ ∈ T ′,M LM′.
Choose arbitrary modelM ∈ T andM′ ∈ T ′, and find a set of operators O and extensionMO ofM to LO
such that there is no extension of M′ which matches the logic of O in MO. We know this will be possible
since otherwise M L M′. We can show moreover that no model M′′ ∈ T ′ can be extended to match the
logic of O inMO; else since T ′ is isomorphic, we could extendM′ to match the logic of O inMO, contrary
to assumption. Consider any extension T O of T to LO which includesMO and any extension T ′O of T ′ to
LO. If these agreed on the logic ofO, then, since all the models within each theory agree with each other on the
logic of O, then every model in T ′O would agree with every model in T O on the logic of O, contrary to our
assumption that no extension of any model in T ′ matches the logic of O inMO; so T ′O does not agree with
T O on the logic of O; since T ′O was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that no extension of T ′ agrees with T O on
the logic of O; and so we have T L T ′.
[⇐] Suppose there is a modelM ∈ T and a modelM′ ∈ T ′ such that there is a witness function g from the
indices ofM to those ofM′. It follows by Lemma A.2 thatMLM′. Consider any extension LO of L with
a new set of operators O, and extensionMO ofM to a model of LO. Find an extensionM′O ofM′ of LO
which matches the logic of O fromMO. Now extend every model in T ′ other thanM′ to match the logic of
O inM′O; we know this will be possible because T ′ is isomorphic with respect to L. Call the resulting set of
models T ′O. For any way of completing the extension of T to a new semantic theory T O of LO, all the models
in the extension will agree withMO on the logic of O, by definition of an extension, and so T O and T ′O will
agree on the logic of O. Hence T L T ′.
Fact 3.2. D L♦ R.
Proof. Recall that our language L♦ contains an infinite set of atoms p, q, r . . . closed under the one-place
sentence operator ♦, and that we assume that all of our semantic theories are sets of models whose sets of
worlds and valuation functions are such that, in any model, any two worlds differ on the truth of some atom,
and such that for any combination of atoms, exactly that set of atoms is true at some world, according to that
model’s valuation function. The relational semantics R is the class of models r of the form 〈Wr, vr, Ir, [[·]]r〉,
where Ir = {〈f, w〉 : f : Wr → ℘(Wr) ∧ w ∈ Wr} and [[·]]r defined as specifed in §3; likewise the domain
semantics D is the class of models d of the form 〈Wd, vd, Id, [[·]]d〉, where Id = {〈s, w〉 : s ⊆ Wd ∧w ∈ Wd},
with the interpretation function again specified as above. D is clearly isomorphic with respect to L♦, as is R,
so by Fact 3.1 it suffices to show that there is a d ∈ D and an r ∈ R s.t. d L♦ r. Choose d at random and let
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r be any model in R built on the same set of worlds and valuation function as d. Let g be a function Id → Ir
as follows. For any index 〈s, w〉 ∈ Id, let g(〈s, w〉) = 〈fs, w〉, where fs is the constant function from worlds
to s. For any atomic sentence p of L♦, p will be trued at i iff p is truer at g(i), since we are assuming the same
stock of worlds and atomic valuation in both models, and since the truth of atomic sentence in these frameworks
depends only on the world parameter of the index and the atomic valuation. Now for any sentence ϕ ∈ L♦,
assume for induction that ϕ is trued at i iff it is truer at g(i). We show that, for arbitrary index i, ♦ϕ is trued at i
iff ♦ϕ is truer at g(i). i will have the form 〈s, w〉, for information state s and world w, and, by our semantics for
♦ in d, ♦ϕ will be trued at i iff ϕ is trued at some element in the set Φ = {〈s, w′〉 : w′ ∈ s}. g(i) will have the
form 〈fs, w〉, and, by our semantics for ♦ in r, ♦ϕ will be truer at g(i) iff ϕ is truer for some element in the set
Ψ = {〈fs, w′〉 : w′ ∈ fs(w)}. Now note that, thanks to the way we constructed g and the fact that fs(w) = s,
g will be a bijection from Φ to Ψ. And so it follows from our assumption for induction that ϕ will be trued at
some element in Φ just in case ϕ is truer at some element in Ψ, and thus ♦ϕ will be trued at i iff ♦ϕ is truer at
g(i). It thus follows by induction on the complexity of formulae that, for any sentence ϕ of L♦ and any index i,
ϕ is trued at i iff ϕ is truer at g(i). Finally, it is easy to see that g is an injection. Given Fact 3.1, it thus follows
that D L♦ R.
Fact 3.3.R L♦ D.
Proof. Consider any models d ∈ D and r ∈ R. Consider an r-index 〈f, w〉, with f(w) = {w′}, vr(p, w′) = 0,
f(w′) = {w′′}, and vr(p, w′′) = 1. Then ♦p will be falser at 〈f, w〉, while ♦(♦p) will be truer at 〈f, w〉. There
is no function g which replicates this pattern in d—i.e. which has ♦p falsed at g(〈f, w〉) and has ♦(♦p) trued at
g(〈f, w〉). This is for the simple reason that, for any index i in Id, ♦ϕ is trued at i iff ♦(♦ϕ) is, since ♦(♦ϕ) is
trued at 〈s, x〉, for any x, iff ♦ϕ is trued at 〈s, w′〉 for some w′ ∈ s iff ϕ is trued at 〈s, w′′〉 for some w′′ ∈ s iff
♦ϕ is trued at 〈s, x〉 for any x. Thus there is no function from the indices of r to those of d which preserves truth
for all ϕ ∈ L♦. Since these models were chosen at random, we have that there is no model r ∈ R and model
d ∈ D s.t. r L♦ d and thus by Fact 3.1 we haveR L♦ D.
Fact 3.5. D ≺L♦− R.
Proof. ThatD L♦− R follows as an immediate corollary of Fact 3.2. The proof thatR L♦− D is as follows.
Consider any models r ∈ R and d ∈ D. Let h be a bijection Wr → Wd such that ∀p ∈ L♦− : ∀w ∈
Wr : vr(p, w) = vd(p, h(w)); that there is such a bijection follows from our assumptions about the stocks of
worlds and valuation functions in any model of D and R. Now consider three different modal bases f , f ′, and
f ′′ from pairs in Ir, and some world w ∈ Wr, with f(w) = f ′(w) = f ′′(w) = ∅. Consider any function
g : Ir → Id which preserves truth for ϕ ∈ L♦−. Suppose that g(〈f, w〉) = 〈s, x〉, g(〈f ′, w〉) = 〈s′, x′〉, and
g(〈f ′′, w〉) = 〈s′′, x′′〉, with 〈s, x〉 , 〈s′, x′〉 , and 〈s′′, x′′〉 all different. Since all worlds differ on the truth of
some atom, we know that x = x′ = x′′ = h(w), else we would have that at least one of g(〈f, w〉), g(〈f ′, w〉),
or g(〈f ′′, w〉) differs from its pre-image on the truth of some atom, contrary to the assumption that g preserves
truth. So we must have that s 6= s′ and s 6= s′′ and s′ 6= s′′. It is easy to see that, for any atom p, ♦p is falser at
all of 〈f, w〉, 〈f ′, w〉, and 〈f ′′, w〉. But there are only two d-indices with h(w) as their world parameter which
make ♦p falsed for every atom p, namely 〈∅, h(w)〉 and
〈
{wfd}, h(w)
〉
, where wfd is the world inWd such that
for every atomic sentence p, vd(p, w
f
d ) = 0. And so either 〈s, x〉 , 〈s′, x′〉 , or 〈s′′, x′′〉 will make ♦p trued for
some p, contrary to the assumption that g preserves truth. Thus any truth-preserving function must take two of
〈f, w〉, 〈f ′, w〉, and 〈f ′′, w〉 to the same index in Id, and thus will fail to be an injection. Since d and r were
chosen arbitrarily, Fact 3.5 follows by Fact 3.1.
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Fact 3.8. U ≺L♦ R.
Proof. Recall that U is the set of models u of the form 〈Wu, vu, Iu, [[·]]u〉, where Iu = {〈s, c〉 : s ∪ c ⊆ Wu},
with [[·]]u as specified in §3, and assuming again that in any U-model, any two worlds differ on the truth of some
atom, and for any set of atoms, there is a world where exactly they are true. First note that U is isomorphic with
respect to L♦. Next, let u be an arbitrary U-model, and let r be a model inR built on the same set of worlds and
valuation function. Let wtu be the world inWu which is such that, for every atom p ∈ L♦ : vu(p, wtu) = 1, and
letwfu be the world inWu which is such that, for every atom p ∈ L♦ : vu(p, wfu) = 0. Where Φ is a set of atomic
sentences, we let Φ refer to the unique world fromWu which verifies those sentences according to vu, and vice
versa. Let h be an injection which takes any pair of subsets ofWu to a subset ofWu (that there is such a function
follows from the fact thatWu must be infinite given our starting language and assumptions about worlds). We
stipulate further that h(
〈
{wfu},∅
〉
) = {wtu}, h(〈{wtu}, {wtu}〉) = {wtu, wfu}; h(
〈
{wfu , wtu}, {wtu}
〉
) = {wfu};
and that h(〈s, c〉) includes wtu whenever wtu ∈ s and s = c. For any sets r, s, let frs be the function which takes
every world inWu to r except wfu , which it takes to s, and let frs∗ be the function which takes every world in
Wu to r except wtu, which it takes to s. We can then define a witness function g as follows: for any pair 〈s, c〉 of
contexts (subsets ofWu), with p ranging over atomic sentences in L♦:
g(〈s, c〉) =

〈
fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}
〉
iff s = c 6= ∅〈
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}
〉
iff c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅〈
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w
f
u
〉
iff c * s〈
f
{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w′∈s:p/∈w′}
h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}
〉
iff s 6= c ∧ c = ∅〈
f
{wtu}
h(〈s,c〉), w
t
u
〉
iff s = c = ∅
First note that g is an injection, since each pair of contexts is taken to an index whose modal base is uniquely
tagged by h(·).
Now note that, for any sentence ϕ ∈ L♦ and i ∈ Iu, ϕ is trueu at i iff ϕ is truer at g(i). To see this, consider
first atomic q. Atomic q is trueu at 〈s, c〉 iff c is the result of removing all and only q¯-worlds from s:48
• if s = c 6= ∅, then this holds iff all the worlds in s are q-worlds iff q ∈ {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} iff q is
truer at g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}
〉
;
• if c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅, then this holds iff all the worlds in c, but none of the worlds in s \ c, are q-worlds, iff
q ∈ {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}, iff q is truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p :
(∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′′)}〉;
• if c * s, then this never holds, in which case q is also falser at g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w
f
u
〉
;
• if s 6= c ∧ c = ∅, then this holds iff no world in s is a q-world iff q ∈ {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} iff q is
truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w
′∈s:p/∈w′}
h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}〉;
• if s = c = ∅, this holds in any case whatsoever, in which case q is also truer at g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
f
{wtu}
h(〈s,c〉), w
t
u
〉
.
Consider next sentences of the form ♦q, for atomic q. In the update semantics, again, ♦q is treated as a
“test”: it takes a context c and returns c unchanged just in case [[q]]u(c) 6= ∅, and otherwise returns ∅. That
means that, for atomic q, 〈s, c〉 ∈ [[♦q]]u iff
48For atomic p, a p-world is a world w where vu(p, w) = 1; a p¯-world is a world where vu(p, w) = 0.
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• (i) there is a q-world in s and s = c; then ♦q is truer at g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}
〉
,
since fsh(〈s,c〉)∗(w) will contain a q-world for any w 6= wtu; and {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} = wtu iff
s = {wtu}, in which case by construction of h we have that h(〈s, c〉) contains wtu, and thus fsh(〈s,c〉)∗({p :
∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}) will then also contain a q-world, namely wtu;
• or (ii) there is no q-world in s, and c = ∅.
– Suppose first that s 6= c. Then ♦q will be truer at g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w
′∈s:p/∈w′}
h(〈s,c〉)∗ ,
{p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}〉, since the fact that q is false throughout s ensures that q will be true
at some world in {w : ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}, and f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w′∈s:p/∈w′}h(〈s,c〉)∗ takes
every world but wtu to {w : ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}. Moreover in this case we have
{p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} = wtu iff 〈s, c〉 =
〈
{wfu},∅
〉
; then h(〈s, c〉) = {wtu} by construction of
h, and so f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w
′∈s:p/∈w′}
h(〈s,c〉)∗ ({p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}) again contains a q-world.
– Suppose next that s = c. Then♦q will be truer at g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
f
{wtu}
h(〈s,c〉), w
t
u
〉
, since f{w
t
u}
h(〈s,c〉)(w
t
u) =
{wtu}.
Next, suppose that ♦q is falseu at 〈s, c〉; this will hold iff:
• s doesn’t contain a q-world and c 6= ∅; then either
– s = c; then g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}
〉
. We know {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} 6=
wtu, for we would only have {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′} = wtu if 〈s, c〉 = 〈{wtu}, {wtu}〉, in which case
s contains a q-world contrary to assumption; and so we have fsh(〈s,c〉)∗({p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p ∈ w′}) =
s; since s doesn’t contain a q-world, ♦q is falser here;
– or c ⊂ s∧c 6= ∅; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′)∧(∀w′′ ∈ (s\c) : p /∈ w′′)}〉.
Suppose first {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} 6= wtu; so we have
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗({p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}) = ∅ and so ♦q is falser.
Suppose next {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} = wtu; then 〈s, c〉 must be〈
{wtu, wfu}, {wtu}
〉
; but then it contains a q-world, contrary to assumption;
– or c * s; then g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w
f
u
〉
, and so f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗(w
f
u) = ∅ and so ♦q will be falser
here;
• or s contains a q-world and s 6= c; then
– either c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) :
p /∈ w′′)}〉. Suppose first {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} 6= wtu; so we
have f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗({p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)}) = ∅ and so ♦q is falser
here; suppose next {p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′) ∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s \ c) : p /∈ w′′)} = wtu, then 〈s, c〉
must be
〈
{wtu, wfu}, {wtu}
〉
; by construction h(
〈
{wfu , wtu}, {wtu}
〉
) = {wfu}; and so in this case,
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗({p : (∀w′ ∈ c : p ∈ w′)∧ (∀w′′ ∈ (s\ c) : p /∈ w′′)}) = {wfu} and so again ♦q is falser;
– or c * s; then g(〈s, c〉) =
〈
f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w
f
u
〉
, and so f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗(w
f
u) = ∅ and so ♦q will be falser
here;
– or s 6= c ∧ c = ∅; then g(〈s, c〉) = 〈f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w′∈s:p/∈w′}h(〈s,c〉)∗ , {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}〉. Provided
{p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} 6= wtu, we have f{w:∀p:p∈w→∀w
′∈s:p/∈w′}
h(〈s,c〉)∗ ({p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}) = {w :
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∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} which will not contain a q-world, since there is a q-world in s.
And in this case we have {p : ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′} = wtu iff 〈s, c〉 =
〈
{wfu},∅}
〉
, contrary to our
assumption that s contains a q-world.
Finally, in any update model, for any ϕ ∈ L♦ and any update index i, ♦(♦ϕ) is trueu at i iff ♦ϕ is trueu at
i. And this will also hold relative to any point in the image of g:
• When s = c = ∅, then both ♦ϕ and ♦(♦ϕ) will be truer (by an obvious induction on the length of
formulas which I leave implicit here);
• when c * s, both will be falser;
• when c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅, g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)) is empty, making both false; unless g2(〈s, c〉) = wtu,
which holds only when s = {wfu , wtu} and c = {wtu}, in which case by construction of h, we have
g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)) = {wfu}.49 Since g1(〈s, c〉)(wfu) = ∅, we again have false;
• when s = c 6= ∅ and g2(〈s, c〉) 6= wtu, we have g1(〈s, c〉) has the same value at g2(〈s, c〉) and at
every element of g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)), provided s does not include wtu; and whenever s includes wtu,
we have g1(〈s, c〉)(wtu) includes wtu by construction of h, and thus that ∀w ∈ s : wtu ∈ g1(〈s, c〉)(w),
and thus that ♦ϕ is true at g2(〈s, c〉) and at every world in g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)); and g2(〈s, c〉) = wtu iff
s = c = {wtu}, in which case ♦ϕ is true for any ϕ at g(〈s, c〉);
• when s 6= c ∧ c = ∅, g2(〈s, c〉) = wtu iff s = {wfu}; then h(〈s, c〉) = {wtu}, so then ♦ϕ is true at
g(〈s, c〉) for all ϕ. When g2(〈s, c〉) 6= wtu, we know that wtu /∈ {w : ∀p : p ∈ w → ∀w′ ∈ s : p /∈ w′}
and so g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)) is the same as g1(〈s, c〉) applied to any element of g1(〈s, c〉)(g2(〈s, c〉)).
And thus we can conclude that ♦ϕ is trueu at i iff ♦ϕ is truer at g(i), for any ϕ ∈ L♦. Thus g is an injection
from the indices of u to those of r which preserves truth for all sentences of L♦, and thus by Fact 3.1 we have
U L♦ R.50
The proof thatR L♦ U will be as for Fact 3.3.
Fact 3.9. U L♦ D.
Proof. Consider arbitrary u ∈ U and d ∈ D. Consider the three u-indices 〈∅, {w}〉 , 〈∅, {w′}〉 , 〈∅, {w′′}〉,
with w, w′, and w′′ all different. These three indices all make p falseu, for any atomic p ∈ L♦; they also make
♦ϕ falseu, for any ϕ ∈ L♦, and thus make every sentence in L♦ falseu. There are, however, only two indices in
d which make every sentence in L♦ falsed, namely
〈
∅, wfd
〉
and
〈
{wfd}, wfd
〉
, where wfd is the world where,
for every atomic sentence p, vd(p, w
f
d ) = 0. Thus any truth-preserving function g : Iu → Id will have to map
at least two of the u-indices in question to the same d-index, and thus will fail to be an injection. Thus Fact 3.9
follows by Fact 3.1.
Fact 3.10. D L♦ U .
49gn is the nth projection of g, i.e. gn(X) = xn iff g(X) = 〈x1, x2, . . . xn, . . .〉.
50Note that not every operator which can be added to U will be well-defined if we want the intension of any sentence in
U to be a function from contexts to contexts, rather than just a relation; there are different approaches within broadly
update-style frameworks to this question (e.g. Heim 1983 vs. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991).
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Proof. Consider arbitrary u ∈ U and d ∈ D. There are exactly three u-indices which make all sentences in L♦
trueu, namely 〈∅,∅〉 ,
〈
{wfu},∅
〉
, and 〈{wtu}, {wtu}〉, where wfu is the world where, for every atomic sentence
p, vu(p, w
f
u) = 0 and where wtu is the world where, for every atomic sentence p, vu(p, w
t
u) = 1. There are more
than three d-indices which make all sentences in L♦ trued: these include 〈Wd, wtd〉 and 〈{wtd}, wtd〉, as well as
〈s, wtd〉 for any s such that {wtd} ⊆ s ⊆ Wd, with wtd defined as for wtu. Thus any function from the indices of
d to those of u which preserves truth for all sentences in L♦ will have to map more than three d-indices to three
u-indices, and so will fail to be an injection. Since d and u were chosen arbitrarily, by Lemma A.2 and Fact 3.1,
D L♦ U .
Fact 3.12. S ≺L♦ D.
Proof. Recall that S is the set of models s of the form 〈Ws, vs, IS , [[·]]s〉 with Is = {s : s ⊆ Ws}, with [[·]]s
specified as in §3, and assuming again that in any model, any two worlds differ on the truth of some atom, and
for any set of atoms, exactly that set is true at some world. Note again that S is isomorphic with respect to
L♦. Chose a model s ∈ S and find a model d ∈ D s.t. Ws = Wd and vs = vd. For convenience we identify
every world inWs with the set of atomic sentences it makes true according to vs. Let the function g take any
information state s ⊆ Ws to 〈s,
⋂
s〉. For atomic p, p is trues at s iff for all w′ ∈ s, vs(p, w′) = 1, iff p ∈
⋂
s,
iff p is trued at g(s) = 〈s,
⋂
s〉. For atomic p, ♦p is trues at s iff s contains a p-world (according to vs) iff ♦p
is trued at g(s) = 〈s,
⋂
s〉. Finally, it holds in both s and d that ♦(♦ϕ) is true at an index iff ♦ϕ is, and so we
know that for any ϕ ∈ L♦, ♦ϕ will be trues at i iff ♦ϕ is trued at g(i). Note finally that g is an injection: for any
s and s′, if s 6= s′, then the first elements of g(s) and g(s′) will differ. Thus by Lemma A.2 we have s L♦ d
and so by Fact 3.1 we have S L♦ D.
But we do not have the converse: D L♦ S. Consider any models s ∈ S and d ∈ D. Consider three
d-indices 〈∅, w〉 and 〈∅, w′〉, and 〈∅, w′′〉 with w, w′, and w′′ all distinct. For any ϕ ∈ L♦, ♦ϕ is falsed at
all these indices. The only indices which make ♦ϕ falses for every ϕ ∈ L♦ are ∅ and {wfs }, where wfs is the
world which makes every atom false according to vs, and thus any truth-preserving function will have to take
two of the d-indices to the same s index, and thus will fail to be an injection; thus by Lemma A.2 and Fact 3.1,
D L♦ S.
Fact 3.13. For any language L and a set of semantic theories T each of which is isomorphic with respect to L,
L is a partial pre-order over T.
Proof. L will be transitive: suppose T L T ′, witnessed by a function g : It → It′ , for t ∈ T , t′ ∈ T ′,
and T ′ L T ′′, witnessed by a function f : It∗′ → It′′ , for t∗′ ∈ T ′, t′′ ∈ T ′′. By isomorphism, there is a
truth-preserving injection h : It′ → It∗′ . f ◦ (h ◦ g) will witness T L T ′′. L is reflexive, witnessed by the
identity function. It is not anti-symmetric, since it is easy to see that there are different semantic theories T and
T ′ isomorphic with respect to L such that T L T ′ and T ′ L T (for instance, two standard semantic theories
for a language just comprising atomic sentences, with the same set of possible worlds but different valuations,
may have this property). And it is not necessarily connected, since, as we saw in the comparison of D to U ,
there are semantic theories which are incommensurable with respect to a given language.
Fact 3.15. D∃ ≺L♦v R∃.
Proof. Note that D∃ andR∃ are both isomorphic with respect to L♦v . Consider a model d∃ ∈ D∃. Find a model
r∃ ∈ R∃ built on the same domain, set of worlds, and valuation function. For any index 〈a, s, w〉 ∈ Id∃ , with a a
variable assignment, s a set of worlds, and w a world, let g be the function which takes 〈a, s, w〉 to the r∃-index
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〈a, fs, w〉, where fs is again the constant function to s. g will witness d∃ L♦v r∃; the proof is a generalization
of the parallel result in the proof of Fact 3.2; and so we have D∃ L♦v R∃. But there is no truth-preserving
injection in the other direction, for the same reasons given in the proof of Fact 3.3. Note moreover that the proof
of Fact 3.5 can be extended to show that D∃ ≺L♦−v R∃.
Fact 3.16. U∃ ≺L♦v R∃.
Proof. First note U∃ is isomorphic with respect to L♦v . Then our proof is very much as in the proof of Fact 3.6.
We construct a witness function g from an arbitrarily chosen model u∃ ∈ U∃ to a model r∃ ∈ R∃ built on the
same set of worlds, valuation function, and domain, using the function h defined in the proof of Fact 3.6; with
the notation defined there:
g(〈a, 〈s, c〉〉) =

〈
a, fsh(〈s,c〉)∗, ιw : ∀R : vu∃(R,w) =
⋂{vu∃(R,w′) : w′ ∈ s}〉 iff s = c 6= ∅
〈a, f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, ιw : ∀R : vu∃(R,w) =⋂{vu∃(R,w′) : w′ ∈ c} \⋃{vu∃(R,w′) : w′ ∈ (s \ c)}〉 iff c ⊂ s ∧ c 6= ∅〈
a, f∅h(〈s,c〉)∗, w
f
u∃
〉
iff c * s
〈a, f{w:∀R∀~d:~d∈vu∃ (R,w)→∀w
′∈s:~d/∈v
u∃ (R,w
′)}
h(〈s,c〉)∗ ,
ιw : ∀n : ∀Rn : vu∃(Rn, w) = Dn \
⋃{vu∃(Rn, w′) : w′ ∈ s}〉 iff s 6= c ∧ c = ∅〈
a, f
{wt
u∃}
h(〈s,c〉), w
t
u∃
〉
iff s = c = ∅
R ranges over relation symbols in the vocabulary ofL♦v ;wtu∃ is the world such that vu∃(Rn, wtu∃) is the universal
n-ary relation, for any n-place relation symbol Rn; and wf
u∃ the world such that vu∃(R
n, wf
u∃) is the empty
relation, for any Rn. D is the domain of individuals; ~d ranges over ordered sequences of elements of D; and ι
ranges over worlds inWu∃ . The proof that g is a witness function is parallel to the proof of Fact 3.6. The proof
thatR∃ L♦v U∃ is parallel to that for Fact 3.3.
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